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 In this thesis I investigate the organizational field that is New Hampshire’s energy policy-
making community as it engages with the state regulatory institution, the Public Utilities 
Commission, to grapple the challenges of designing a 21st century electricity marketplace. 
The Public Utilities Commission structure and function are evolving. Historically, the 
Commission has used adjudicative proceedings to carry out a ratemaking function for monopoly 
utilities. The Commission’s adjudicative process is evolving to become increasingly 
collaborative as it begins to carry out its new function of 21st century electricity market design. I 
analyze both the new structure (collaboration) and the new function (21st century electricity 
market design) of the Commission through three in-depth case studies of dockets (policy-making 
processes): Energy Efficiency Resource Standard, Electric Grid Modernization, and Net 
Metering. 
My findings identify ways in which the Public Utilities Commission structure for making 
energy policy decisions is flexible and may be shaped by stakeholders engaging in policy 
processes. Stakeholders have the power to collectively design regulatory proceedings to 
incorporate greater opportunities for collaboration to better suit the challenges posed by a 21st 
century electricity sector. I provide recommendations on how that redesign should occur.
  1
 
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
 
Vision of a 21st Century Energy System 
Imagine a bustling New Hampshire city with a population of 20,000. Like many New 
Hampshire communities, this one is centered on a river. Its downtown mill buildings are 
tastefully refurbished and humming with a healthy mix of residential and commercial spaces – 
apartments and businesses and breweries and restaurants, the latter two stocked near exclusively 
with locally sourced menu items. But food is not the only societal system that has undergone 
extensive localization in recent years. The city produces 50% of its electricity as well. The year 
is 2030 and the electricity system is finally catching up with the 21st century. 
Ten years prior, municipal leaders from the energy committee and city council, motivated 
by commitments to fiscal conservatism and the principles of sustainability, worked together to 
establish the city’s first Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy District.1 Within the district, several 
21st century energy companies have since financed millions of dollars of clean energy and energy 
efficiency improvements for residential, commercial, and municipal establishments alike. 
Investments cover the gamut from building weatherization and LED lighting upgrades, to solar 
installations and air source heat pumps, to Tesla Powerpacks and electric vehicle charging 
infrastructure, to combined-heat-and-power gas-fired microturbines in some of the larger 
establishments. This symphony of distributed energy resources (DERs) is conducted via internet-
connected automation, communication, and control systems, which synchronize real-time 
responses to changes in electric grid conditions. Homeowners, businesses, and municipal 
                                                 
1 See New Hampshire RSA 53-f. 
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facilities alike generate much of their own electricity, and are credited for excess energy fed into 
the grid and consumed by their neighbors. The city’s growing smart grid helps the larger electric 
system keep costs down by managing electricity demand, and by providing other technical 
services such as voltage and frequency regulation. The energy savings and revenues from 21st 
century energy services are shared between the energy companies and citizens.  
Day by day this vision of a localized, sustainable 21st century smart city energy system 
moves closer towards reality. Over the past decade, and with increasing intensity in recent years, 
the iterative cycle of policy change and market development has set in motion the remaking of 
our electricity systems. At the turn of the millennium, the 21st century smart grid may have 
seemed more science fiction than reality, but today, in 2017, New Hampshire communities from 
Dover to Warner to Lebanon are laying the foundation on which this vision will be realized. 
 My focus in the pages to come will be on the electricity sector disruption associated with 
expanding markets for distributed energy resources (DERs) – a category which includes 
distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar, microturbines), geothermal energy systems, smart 
energy metering technology, energy efficiency, management of electricity demand, energy 
storage, electric vehicles, electric vehicle charging infrastructure, and Internet of Things 
synchronization of aforementioned technologies. My research examines the three major New 
Hampshire regulatory policy processes addressing 21st century electricity market design through 
DER integration: 
• DE 15-137: Electric and Gas Utility Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) 
(Chapter 2) 
• IR 15-296: Investigation into Electric Grid Modernization (Grid Mod) (Chapter 3) 
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• DE 16-576: Development of New Alternative Net Metering Tariffs and/or Other 
Regulatory Mechanisms and Tariffs for Customer Generators (Net Metering) (Chapter 4) 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I first contextualize New 
England’s evolving energy landscape by reviewing recent policy and market trends across the 
region. I then describe the series of 21st century electricity system policy challenges and 
introduce the community of actors grappling with these challenges in New Hampshire’s energy 
policy-making arenas. Next, I introduce the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC), 
the state institution charged with regulating electric utilities and now newly tasked with resolving 
energy policy disputes between utilities and DER affiliates. I then review New Hampshire 
energy policy reports calling on the PUC to abandon adversarial dispute resolution and adopt a 
more collaborative approach to making energy policy decisions. Next, I review the literature to 
introduce and contrast adjudicative and collaborative approaches to dispute resolution. Finally, I 
present my research design and methodology for answering my overarching research question: 
How does the PUC process limit or support opportunity for collaboration? The purpose of my 
research is to provide insight into how the NH energy policy-making community may adopt a 
more collaborative approach towards solving 21st century energy system policy challenges. 
 
New England’s Evolving Energy Landscape 
 Growing DER markets represent the convergence of the three overarching trends 
reshaping New England’s electricity landscape: (1) increasingly competitive electricity markets; 
(2) increasing decentralization of energy resources; and (3) accelerating deployment of lower- 
and zero-carbon energy resources. These trends are a result of a combination of local, state, 
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regional, and federal policies and macroeconomic, technology-driven factors including the U.S. 
natural gas revolution and the dramatic cost declines in industries like wind and solar. Actively 
embracing and encouraging trends towards competitive, distributed, sustainable electricity 
systems has obvious economic, social, environmental, and national security advantages for 
policy makers, but redesigning the path-dependent electricity system of decades long past into 
one more compatible with 21st century society raises dauntingly complex policy challenges. 
 The New England states have collectively implemented a multitude of policies geared 
towards promoting a competitive, decentralized, and sustainable electricity market. Table 1.1 
illustrates the volume of renewable energy and energy efficiency incentive policies across New 
England. The regional market for solar photovoltaics (PV) has grown dramatically in recent 
years, as illustrated by Fig. 1.1 and is projected to continue to expand in the years to come. 
Energy efficiency programs in New England are some of the most ambitious in the nation and 
region-wide funding for energy efficiency has been steadily increasing, as illustrated by Fig. 1.2. 
ISO New England, the not-for-profit independent system operator for New England’s regional 
electric grid, projects that from 2021 to 2026, the six states will collectively invest $1.2 billion 
annually in energy efficiency programs (ISO New England, 2016). The New England states are 
also beginning to explore extensive regulatory overhauls of their electric utility systems in an 
effort to further guide the trends towards competition, decentralization, and decarbonization. 
Table 1.2 presents an illustrative selection of policies contributing to the evolution of the 






Table 1.1 – Number of Distinct State Incentive Programs for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the New England States 
 
State 
Number of Distinct Incentive Programs for Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency (as of September 2017) 
Massachusetts 99 
Connecticut 67 
New Hampshire 62 
Vermont 49 
Rhode Island 46 
Maine 31 
Source: Database for State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 2017 
 
Table 1.2 – Selection of New England Policies Supporting Competition, 
Decentralization, and Decarbonization in the Electricity Sector 
 
Policy Description Applicable In 
Electric Utility 
Restructuring 
Legislation directing utility divestiture of 
generation fleets to introduce competition in 
power generation markets 




Cap and trade program for regional power sector; 
in effect, puts a price on emissions from the power 
sector contributing to climate change 
All New England States 
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) 
Legislation directing utilities to procure increasing 
portions of their electricity mix from renewable 
sources and providing incentives for investments 
in renewables 
All New England States 
Net Metering Owners of distributed generation systems (e.g., 
rooftop solar) may receive credits for excess 
generation fed into grid from utilities  




Mandated energy savings targets for electric (and 
in some cases gas) utilities and incentives for 
energy efficiency investments 
All New England States 
Electric Grid 
Modernization2 
Regulatory reform initiatives seeking to remake 
electric utility incentive structures and encourage 
market-based DER deployment 
CT, MA, NH, RI, VT 
 
   
 
                                                 
2 See in particular CT PURA 17-06-02 (Section 103 of June Special Session Public Act 15-5); MA Grid 
Mod (D.P.U. 12-76-B); MA Smart Grid Pilot Programs; MA Energy Storage Initiative; NH Grid Mod 
(PUC IR 15-296); NH Net Metering Alternatives Order No. 26,029 (PUC DE 16-576); RI Renewable 
Energy Growth Program (Chapter 26.6 of Title 39 of RI General Laws); RI Power Sector Transformation 
Initiative (PUC Docket No. 4600); and VT Review of Utility Regulation (PSB Case No. 17-3142-PET). 
  6
 
Figure 1.1 – Historical Installed PV Capacity Survey Results: December 2013 – December 2016 (MWAC) (Source: 





Figure 1.2 – 2004-2014 Trends in Energy Efficiency Funding in the Six New England States (Source: ISO New 
England, 2016) 
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Despite the wave of activity, continuing the progress towards a 21st century electricity 
system requires that policy makers address further policy challenges. Policy action and evolving 
markets can have an iterative, circular relationship: policy and advancing technology feed 
innovation and market transformation, which raise new questions and challenges about how the 
market should continue its evolution, which in turn calls for further policy action. This is 
particularly the case for electricity markets, which, importantly, have never resembled anything 
close to a free, unregulated market, save perhaps for the brief years following their inception in 
the mid-19th century. The past decade of policy action and concurrent technological 
advancements have largely succeeded in creating scalable DER markets, but in doing so have 
given rise to questions about how such markets should be designed and integrated with the 
existing monopolistic market for electricity services. 
 
21st Century Energy Policy Challenges 
Energy policy making can occur through legislative, executive, judicial, and 
administrative/regulatory processes.3 The focus of my thesis is entirely on the 
administrative/regulatory policy design processes, which occur at the New Hampshire Public 
Utilities Commission (referred to as either the Commission or PUC). The overarching challenge 
for energy policymakers is how to guide existing market trends toward competition, 
decentralization, and decarbonization. The following seven examples provide further detail of 
the current policy challenges. 
                                                 
3 Some might argue the administrative/regulatory branch of government is a subsidiary of the executive 
branch. New Hampshire’s three regulatory Commissioners are appointed to six-year terms by the 
Governor (who serves a two-year term) and approved by the Executive Council. But the interests of the 
Governor’s office are represented in PUC proceedings by the Office of Strategic Initiatives (formerly 
Office of Energy and Planning). For this reason, and because of the compelling case made by McCraw 
1984 that there are in fact four, not three, branches of American governance, I distinguish between the 
executive and the administrative/regulatory. 
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Policy Challenge #1: Widespread DER adoption is inherently incompatible with the traditional 
business model of regulated monopoly electric utilities. How can policy makers reconcile the 
conflict between DER adoption and traditional utility business models? 
 
In January 2013, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the trade association representing all 
U.S. investor-owned electric utility companies, released a report warning that unchecked growth 
in DER markets would inevitably erode the financial well-being of the electric utility industry 
(Kind, 2013). The danger for utilities, according to the report, is that as DER adoption 
accelerates it sets in motion a positive feedback loop, a vicious cycle in which customers opting 
for DERs amplify the conditions driving DER adoption in the first place. DER adoption allows 
customers to extricate themselves from previously compulsory participation in the pool of 
customers paying for utility costs. As DER adoption spreads, the pool of customers covering the 
utility’s costs becomes smaller and smaller and the portion of those costs apportioned to each 
remaining customer grows larger and larger, thus driving more and more customers into the open 
arms of the DER industry. Fig. 1.3 from the EEI report depicts this vicious cycle (colloquially 
referred to as the utility death spiral) (EE: energy efficiency; DR: demand response). Because of 
the conflict between the traditional utility business model and widespread DER adoption, 
questions about DER integration are an inevitable source of tension and disagreement between 
the two colliding industries. 
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Figure 1.3 – Vicious Cycle of Utility Lost Revenue from Disruptive Forces (Source: Kind 2013) 
  
Policy Challenge #2: How can policy makers introduce competition into monopoly markets for 
retail electricity services? 
Regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit… Every industry… that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to 
control entry… and retard the rate of growth of new firms. 
– George Stigler (1971) 
 
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural 
price, or the price of free competition, is the lowest which can be taken. 
– Adam Smith (1776) 
 
The history of the electric power system is the history of the struggle between monopoly 
control and competitive market forces (Hirsh, 1999; Lambert, 2015). Gradually, beginning in the 
1970s and continuing over subsequent decades, competition was introduced to bulk generation 
of electricity in wholesale markets, despite intense anti-competition lobbying from incumbent 
utilities (Hirsh, 1999). However, transmission and distribution systems remain tightly controlled 
utility monopolies, which discourages competition in retail markets. The competitive nature of 
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electricity generation is important to understand because there are lessons to be drawn for the 
current challenge of competitive DER integration. Competition in bulk generation and wholesale 
electricity markets was accomplished by allowing competitive power generators equal access to 
monopoly-owned transmission infrastructure. Competition can similarly be brought to the 
distributed generation and retail electricity markets by allowing DER providers equal access to 
monopoly-owned distribution infrastructure (see Fig 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4 – Components of the Electricity System 
 
The electricity industry in the United States was founded on what Hirsh (1999) calls the 
utility consensus. The utility consensus posited that in order to achieve the greatest economies of 
scale to allow for rapid and low-risk proliferation of cheap electricity to the furthest corners of 
America, a single vertically integrated corporation should receive exclusive franchise rights to 
own and operate generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure in a given geographic 
area, free of competition. In exchange for the exclusive monopoly franchise, the utility 
corporation subjects itself to government regulation to ensure it does not abuse its monopoly 
power to extort exorbitant profits from the public. 
 
 Wholesale Electricity Markets  Retail Electricity Markets 
 
 
        Generation       Transmission    Distribution       DERs  
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The consensus was largely designed by the first great utility robber baron, Samuel Insull, 
who realized, “In the long run, regulation means protection” (Lambert, 2015, p. 18). Importantly, 
while utility managers often construe government regulation as onerous and burdensome, the 
reality is that these same utility managers are responsible for the construction of the regulatory 
system and simultaneously one of its greatest beneficiaries. Government regulation legitimizes 
the utilities’ right to monopoly control and helps to insulate the system from competition (Hirsh, 
1999). One consequence of the binary relationship between regulators and monopolies is 
regulation often tends to function as a protective device rather than as a promotional or 
developmental one. Regulation often suppresses rapid industrial change and innovation 
(McCraw, 1984). 
New Hampshire is famous (or not) for a very special section of a very special law passed 
by the United States Congress in the wake of the 1970s energy crisis: President Carter’s Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Prior to the passage of PURPA, utility 
corporations enjoyed comfortable vertical integration: one company owned and operated the 
entire system of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity (see Fig. 1.4). PURPA 
opened up opportunity for states to bring competition to the generation of electricity. The 
introduction of competition to the generation of electricity allowed the country to diversify its 
energy portfolio, reduce costs, and create a more efficient marketplace. 
Wheelabrator-Frye, a New Hampshire power company operating cogeneration plants 
(electricity and heat), and its ally Senator John Durkin of New Hampshire, lobbied the U.S. 
Congress to include in PURPA a provision that revolutionized the competitive nature of 
wholesale electricity markets (Hirsh, 1999). Prior to PURPA, utility monopolies owning 
transmission infrastructure could squeeze all competitive generation companies out of the market 
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by charging them excessive access fees for the use their transmission highways. Without 
transmission highway access, there was no competition in the generation of electricity. 
Consumers had no choice but to consume the electricity generated from power plants owned by 
the vertically integrated utility, even if third-party competitive generators could produce 
electricity more cheaply. In just a few years after the passage of PURPA and its special section 
(thanks to Granite Staters), more than half of the utility industry’s annual generation capacity 
additions came from competitive, independent power producers, dramatically reshaping electric 
power markets across the country (Hirsh, 1999). This is referred to in the industry as 
restructuring and/or deregulation. 
Today, ISO-New England, the independent system operator for the regional electric 
system, coordinates a symphony of competitive energy generators, calling power plants online 
through a merit order bidding system in which the cheapest producers are at the front of the line 
and the most expensive are at the back. Wholesale prices are based on real-time and forecasted 
demand for electricity. Almost all New England utilities have divested of their generation fleets, 
becoming poles and wires companies only. Open access to transmission infrastructure and price 
signals based on demand created a competitive market for electricity generation. 
Competition in bulk or wholesale generation of electricity, supplied by equal access to 
transmission infrastructure and price signals based upon real-time demand for electricity, is a 
very different thing from competition in retail electricity services, which would require equal 
access to distribution infrastructure and similar real-time price signals. In this way, retail 
markets are less competitive than wholesale markets. Much of the controversy surrounding 
distributed energy resource (DER) integration is wrapped up in the challenge of expanding 
competitive access to the distribution system and retail electricity markets. Competitive access 
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to distribution infrastructure and price signals based on demand can create competitive retail 
electricity markets, much in the way competitive access to transmission infrastructure and price 
signals based on demand created a competitive wholesale electricity market (see Fig. 1.4).  
 
Policy Challenge #3: How can policy makers redesign electricity markets to send more accurate 
price signals that optimize economic efficiency? 
Economic Efficiency: an economic state in which every resource is optimally allocated to serve 
each individual or entity in the best way while minimizing waste and inefficiency… In terms of 
production, goods are produced at their lowest possible cost, as are the variable inputs of 
production (Investopedia, 2017). 
 
 Due to the regulated, command-and-control nature of the 20th century utility monopoly, 
the retail electricity market is devoid of economically efficient price signals. Prices, rather than 
reflecting the equilibrium of supply and demand as is the case in competitive markets, are set by 
bureaucrats and utility managers, “accountants in a dark room” pouring over spreadsheets in the 
“hard-to-penetrate, rate-setting place” of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) (NH Interview 
1, 2016). Imagine the stereotypical archetype of U.S.S.R. central planners circa 1965, sitting in 
their drab, gray office parks, flipping through abaci and carefully penciling out prices for the 
next five-year plan of biscuits and boots. Today, in 2017 America, retail electricity prices are set 
in much the same fashion, and have little to do with supply and demand. 
 The old system typically uses flat rates for retail electricity prices, rates that remain 
unchanged regardless of time of consumption and regardless of the relative demand at the time 
of consumption. Flat rates are “inappropriate and misleading… [and] fail to recognize real costs” 
(Lazar and Gonzalez, 2015, p. 9). A kilowatt-hour (kWh) consumed at 3pm on the hottest day of 
summer when air conditioners are blasting away and the electric grid is running at maximum 
capacity is the same price to the average customer as a kWh consumed at times of low electricity 
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demand. However, the true costs imposed on the system by these two examples of electricity 
consumption, are, in the long run, dramatically different; peak-time summer electricity 
consumption, when demand is at its highest, drives overall systems costs to a much greater 
extent than consumption at times of low demand. By the same logic, a kWh saved during times 
of high electricity demand provides a much greater value to the electric system as a whole. But 
the current system, with its flat rate structure, does nothing to communicate to consumers the 
true costs and benefits of their electricity consumption patterns.  
 An economically efficient electricity market would communicate the nuances associated 
with supply and demand at the time of consumption and production to consumers and producers 
of electricity. Offering smart rate options to consumers, rates that more accurately communicate 
the true cost of electricity consumption based on demand, would allow the engaged customer to 
reduce her individual electricity costs and simultaneously reduce costs for all system users by 
improving the economic efficiency of the system as a whole. These smart rate offerings are an 
essential prerequisite for the deployment of the 21st century energy vision. Without smart rates, 
the very real value associated with the symphony-like city smart grid will remain unrealized. 
Regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders are beginning to grapple with the challenges of 
designing and implementing such smart rates to improve economic efficiency across the system 
(see Lazar and Gonzalez, 2015; NARUC, 2016; and Convery et al., 2017). 
 




 As illustrated by policy challenge #1, efficiency and DER adoption erode the financial 
well-being of the traditionally regulated electric utility. This is because the traditional, 20th 
century electric utility is compensated through two primary mechanisms: (1) volumetric sales, 
and (2) regulated return on investment on capital expenditures. In other words, the utility 
“wants” to sell more electricity, and the utility “wants” to spend cash on expensive system 
upgrades and expansion. If states wish to advance a 21st century energy system and wish to keep 
their electric utilities from going bankrupt, they must reconsider approaches to electric utility 
compensation. 
Many states have undergone regulatory overhauls and made their utilities indifferent to 
volume of electricity flowing through their wires. This regulatory shift is known as decoupling 
and is one potential remedy for the discord between the traditionally regulated utility and an 
efficient, decentralized 21st century energy system (see Lazar, 2015; NREL, 2009; NARUC, 
2007; Moskovitz, et al., 1992). 
The second traditional component of a utility’s compensation, the incentive to prioritize 
capital expenditures on grid expansion, presents a similar obstacle to DER integration. When the 
utility makes capital expenditures on poles, wires, substations, etc., it expands the base from 
which it earns its return on investment. The more the utility spends on infrastructure expansion, 
the larger the number on which the utility earns its percentage rate of return, and the happier the 
utility shareholder. 
But DER competitors argue implementation of their technologies can meet electric 
system planning, design, and maintenance needs at lower costs and with greater efficiency than 
traditional utility solutions. DER providers are jockeying for the opportunity to supplant the need 
for conventional utility solutions by deploying non-wires alternatives, i.e., coordinated systems 
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of DERs. If DERs can offset the need for the utility to make investments in traditional grid 
expansion, the utility loses out on a core profit opportunity. Policy makers must find solutions 
that reward utilities for acting as a platform to facilitate competitive DER solutions. 
 
Policy Challenge #5: How can DERs be fairly compensated for their services? 
 
 The smart rates discussed in policy challenge #3 present one solution to this challenge. 
Smart rates can send more accurate price signals which, for example, can tell an automated 
washing machine to run when electricity prices are lowest, or tell a fleet of batteries when 
demand is high and compensate them accordingly for a discharge of stored energy into the grid. 
But, in addition to their temporal benefits, DERs can also provide geographic benefits to the 
electricity system.   
 Current compensation methodologies for DERs are primitive. The primary policy 
mechanism for compensating distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar), is net metering. Net 
metering is a primitive compensation method for the same reason flat rates send poor price 
signals to consumers; owners of distributed generation are compensated at the flat, retail rate for 
electricity, i.e., the same rate they pay to consume electricity from the grid. Flat rate net metering 
leads to random solar deployment, which is great for the individual who wishes to take control of 
his energy use, but limited in its ability to optimize the systemic redesign of the electric grid. A 
solar array plopped in a field miles away from a congruous day-time electricity load is much less 
valuable than a solar array powering a commercial center whose energy use patterns roughly 
correspond with the array’s production profile. Twenty-first century smart grid solutions will 
  17
compensate DERs for locational as well as temporal values. The question remains, what are 
these values, and how do we compensate DERs for them? 
 
Policy Challenge #6: There is a lack of data informing decisions. What is the best way to collect 
and share data about when, where, and how electricity is produced and consumed across the 
system in order to better resolve many of the previously discussed policy challenges? 
 
 DER integration is fraught with uncertainty. For the past century, the traditional electric 
utility system, immune to competitive pressures, has coasted along indifferent to innovative 
opportunities presented by advancing technology, namely, computers, the Internet, and 
associated data processing capabilities. While many tech-savvy industries of the modern age are 
racing to collect, process, and capitalize on reams of data, utility monopolies have made 
shockingly little progress in collecting and using data to optimize their systems. Utility 
customers have, until now, scarcely had the option of leaving their monopoly electricity provider 
for one offering more modern solutions and because of this, there has been no impetus for 
utilities to innovate and enter the world of big data optimization. 
Twenty-first century energy solutions require data, and lots of them. The synchronized 
city smart grid will rely on data about when, where, and how energy is used, consumed, and 
generated across the network. Without those data, questions about the value of DERs and smart 
grid resources are impossible to answer and it is impossible to accurately compensate those 
resources for the services they can provide to the system. Collecting data and creating a granular 
baseline understanding about how electricity and DERs interact across the system is an essential 
component of constructing a 21st century energy system. 
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*** 
To summarize, policy and market developments are catalyzing significant shifts in 
electricity markets towards competition, decentralization, and decarbonization. These shifts in 
turn raise a series of new policy challenges. Old utility business/regulatory models are 
economically inefficient and conflict with 21st century smart grid optimization. New competitive 
actors are challenging unilateral monopoly control. Current electricity rate structures are 
primitive and inhibit progress. While the old utility model is clearly obsolete, it is less clear what 
its future replacement will look like. Policy makers have yet to establish economically efficient 
methods for capturing the temporal and locational values of DERs. And all of the above issues 
are compounded by the absence of necessary data about when, where, and how electricity is 
produced and consumed across the system. Further confounding this issue, the utility controls 
access to the very data that may enable the undoing of its torpid, century-long hegemony. 
These six challenges, Herculean in their own right, are further exacerbated by one final 
and overarching challenge. It is from this final policy challenge that I derive my research 
question. 
 
Policy Challenge #7: Twenty-first century electricity market design requires numerous and 
diverse parties to engage in inter-organizational decision making. This vastly increases 
complexity of decision-making processes, which are encumbered by antiquated 20th century 
practices. How can we re-design the decision-making process to facilitate collaboration among 
the diversity of actors? 
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The three policy processes examined in my research involve dozens of organizations 
colliding with one another in PUC proceedings, each vying to achieve its individual interests. 
Figure 1.5 and Table 1.3 provide a brief overview and description of many, but not nearly all, of 
the various organizations engaging in NH PUC regulatory proceedings for 21st century electricity 
market design. Broadly speaking, actors can be divided into five categories: (1) the state; (2) the 
investor-owned utilities; (3) the local DER affiliates; (4) the national interest groups; and (5) 
miscellaneous actors. None of the aforementioned challenges can be adequately addressed 
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Table 1.3 – New Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community 





Representatives from the Air Resources Division of DES intervene in dockets with specific environmental 
outcomes (e.g., efficiency, electric vehicles, grid modernization). 
 
Office of Energy and 
Planning (OEP) 
 
Arm of the Governor’s office. (Under the Sununu administration, OEP was renamed Office of Strategic 




• The arbiters and final decision makers. 
Relevant Divisions: 
• Electric Division: Executes cost-of-service regulation for monopoly electric utility corporations. Managed 
the EERS docket unilaterally; managed the Net Metering docket in partnership with the Sustainable 
Energy Division. 
• Legal Division: Supports other divisions in all manner of affairs. Often plays facilitation role. 
• Sustainable Energy Division: Oversees implementation of state sustainable energy programs. Managed 
the Net Metering docket in partnership with the Electric Division. 
Administratively Attached Agencies: 
• Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA): Represents the collective interests of New Hampshire’s energy 
consumers. 
Consultants to the Commission: 
• Raab Associates: Expert in consensus building for utility regulation, facilitated the Grid Modernization 
Working Group. 
• Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) (nonprofit): Experts on all things utility regulation whose mission is 




The largest electric utility in New England with over 320 million customers. Formerly Public Service 
Company of New Hampshire (PSNH). 
Liberty Utilities 
New Hampshire’s smallest electric utility and a subsidiary of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. Liberty also 
operates a gas business. 











Dedicated to advancing the clean energy future in the Northeast. Intervened in the three dockets that are the 
subject of this thesis. 
 
Borrego Solar One of the largest commercial-scale solar developers in the region. Intervened in the Net Metering docket. 
City of Lebanon (CoL) 
Represented by former PUC Commissioner, former State Senator, former State Representative, current City 
Councilor of Lebanon, Clifton Below. 
Conservation Law 
Foundation (CLF) 




Represents the interests of over 90 New Hampshire-based DER companies. 
Northeast Clean Energy 
Council (NECEC) 
Regional advocate for clean energy. Supports NHSEA regularly in regulatory matters. 
Patricia A. Martin Retired electrical engineer and Grid Mod collaborator. 
ReVision Energy Northern New England’s largest solar company. 
Revolution Energy 
A pioneer in the business and policy innovation of DER integration. Represented by the author in Grid Mod 









Trade association representing fossil fuel industries masquerading as a pro-solar advocate in Net Metering 
docket. 
Energy Freedom 
Coalition for America 
(EFCA) 
Advocated on behalf of Tesla Inc. and subsidiary SolarCity in Grid Mod and Net Metering dockets. 
The Alliance for Solar 
Choice (TASC) 
Advocates on behalf of U.S. solar industry. 
Miscellaneous 
Business & Industry 
Association (BIA) 
Statewide chamber of commerce. 
Competitive Energy 
Suppliers 








Represents New Hampshire hydropower industry. 
NH Legal Assistance Advocates on behalf of low- and moderate-income groups. 
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The Public Utilities Commission – Regulatory Evolution for the 21st Century 
The role of regulators is to bring the interests of the public and 
those of the corporations into identity. 
– Charles Francis Adams Jr., 1870s (as cited in McCraw, 1984, p. 32) 
 
Every U.S. state has a Public Utilities Commission or the equivalent thereof. The Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC) is the institution that lies at the center of New Hampshire’s energy 
policy-making community. It is both the physical space within which organizations convene to 
address policy challenges and the final decision maker. Because of its central importance, I will 
devote a few paragraphs to the PUC. 
The PUC, not by design but by default, has become the authority responsible for 
resolving 21st century energy policy challenges and facilitating the integration of solar, batteries, 
demand response, and other DERs into the electric system. Facilitating DER integration 
represents a dramatic departure from the traditional role of the Commission: monopoly 
ratemaking. 
Historically, Commissions have played the role of neutral arbiter, an impartial judge 
presiding over evidence-based contests between utilities and consumer advocates to ensure 
monopoly power is not abused to extort exorbitant profits from the general public. The PUC’s 
mandate includes the responsibility for ensuring decisions reflect the public interest. 
Commissions also check monopoly power and balance the interests of utility shareholders and 
electricity consumers much in the way a judicial body uncovers the truth: through adversarial 
legal contests between utility lawyers on the one side and regulators and consumer advocates on 
the other with the goal of arriving at Goldilocks outcomes, rates that are not too high and not too 
low but just right. 
Three important points to acknowledge and consider regarding the role of the PUC: 
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1. In the absence of another state agency with the resources, expertise, and mandate to 
manage 21st century electricity market design, the onus to do so has fallen on the 
Commission as the most practical of a limited number of available candidates (despite 
requiring it to diverge from its original function of setting monopoly energy rates). 
2. While energy policy making occurs through Commission proceedings, the Commission 
itself is not the policy designer, but rather the final rule-making arbiter who, after all of 
the evidence has been presented, after the last witness has said his piece, decides the final 
outcome. Special interests, utilities, solar companies, environmental and consumer 
advocates, and fossil fuel lobbying groups provide the content on which final rulings are 
based. 
3. The traditional PUC process for resolving disputes, while providing opportunities for 
collaborative approaches to decision making, invariably leads to an adversarial hearing in 
which opposing coalitions are pitted against one another. The traditional, adversarial 
process was designed for monopoly ratemaking and not for managing competitive DER 
integration and resolving 21st century energy policy challenges. 
 
Today, the PUC must adapt to take on its new responsibility of resolving 21st century 
energy policy challenges, but it remains encumbered by an adversarial architecture designed for 
its 20th century function of monopoly utility ratemaking. PUC adjudication is ill-suited for 
addressing 21st century energy policy challenges. Like the energy sector surrounding it, the 
Commission is in a state of evolution. In order to successfully carry out its new function, the 
Commission must reassess its regulatory strategy. 
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The following excerpt from Thomas K. McCraw’s Pulitzer Prize-winning history of 
regulation summarizes his core thesis and provides valuable lessons for regulators: 
More than any other single factor, the underlying structure of the particular industry being 
regulated has defined the context in which regulatory agencies have operated… The industry may 
be regarded as the dog, the regulatory agency only as the tail. Yet many students of regulation 
have assumed that tails wag dogs and, further, that one standard type of tail can wag whatever 
breed of dog may be attached. Such observers… have missed a larger truth: the industries that 
these similarly-structured commissions regulated were extremely diverse. Thus these observers 
have duplicated the errors made historically by many regulators themselves, who often paid more 
attention to legal processes and administrative procedures than to the greater task of framing 
strategies appropriate to the particular industries they were regulating. For all parties who seek to 
understand regulation, the most important single consideration is the appropriateness of the 
regulatory strategy to the industry involved (McCraw, 1984, p. 305–306). 
 
McCraw’s argument is that regulatory strategies must be designed to match the 
underlying structure of the particular industry they propose to regulate. His central point is that 
the careless transposition of a regulatory strategy from one industry to the next without 
consideration of the differing structures of the industries is synonymous with failure. The danger 
at present is, as Commissions across the country pivot to face the disruptive challenges due to the 
proliferation of DERs, they may ignore McCraw’s warning and attempt to meet these challenges 
with the same tools and mindsets that served them in regulating monopoly utilities. A more 
effective method would be for regulators to study and acknowledge the dramatic differences 
between the structure of the centralized, monopolistic, and unimaginative utility industry of the 
20th century and the decentralized, competitive, and ever-innovating DER industry of the 21st 
century. 
 Today’s context of burgeoning DER markets and traditional utility sector disruption call 
for new regulatory approaches. Sonia Aggarwal, a leading thinker in 21st energy policy issues, 
articulates well the obsolescence of old approaches to regulation: 
Traditional regulation was quite effective when we were trying to build out the power grid to 
meet growing demand for electricity and provide universal access to electricity. Now, we are in a 
period of flat or even declining electricity demand, and the old utility value engine is running out 
of gas. Costs have plummeted for new technologies, offering new opportunities for utilities to 
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optimize energy use. At the same time, third parties are taking advantage of those new 
technologies to offer products and services directly to customers—effectively competing with 
utility business and eroding sales. This is all happening amidst a growing imperative to clean up 
emissions from the power system – for reasons of national security, economic stability, public 
health, and climate change. Utilities are important institutions intended to serve the public interest 
cost-effectively. And a new regulatory approach… can help keep utilities financially healthy as 
they deliver customer and societal value during this time of transition (Aggarwal, 2016, p. 1). 
 
A 2017 report from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is similarly critical of 
adjudication, siting, “litigated process, poor communications, relationships that do not build 
trust, and a lack of consensus about outcomes” as key impediments to the alignment of utility 
incentives and public policy goals (LBNL, 2017, p. 75). The 21st century electricity system will 
have to incorporate and integrate the expertise and interests of both the utility sector and the 
DER sector, but strict adjudicatory contests are not conducive to the integration of these two 
camps and the production of creative, mutual-gain solutions. 
Alternatively, collaborative processes, mediation, and consensus building are more likely 
to allow the stakeholders to collectively answer the difficult and complex policy challenges 
presented by today’s energy environment. In New Hampshire specifically, numerous 
stakeholders and several studies have already recommended the PUC adopt a more collaborative 
approach to better address the challenges of the day (Vermont Energy Investment Corporation 
[VEIC], 2011; New Hampshire Office of Legislative Budget Assistant [NHLBA], 2012; 
Hatfield, et al., 2013; VEIC, 2013; NH Office of Energy and Planning [NHOEP]). 
In general, energy policy disputes can be managed according to one of two approaches: 
adjudication or collaboration. Adjudication is the conventional structure of regulatory energy 
policy-making proceedings and it has historically fulfilled a cost-of-service ratemaking function 
for monopoly utilities. In 2011, a legislatively commissioned study of New Hampshire energy 
policy issues found the PUC’s “adjudicated regulatory proceedings are perhaps the least effective 
forum for contemplating program design changes, and reaching agreement on how effective they 
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will be at market development and transformation” (Vermont Energy Investment Corporation 
[VEIC], et al., 2011, p. 1-10). Similarly, a 2013 energy policy report by former Governor 
Hassan’s Energy and Environment Transition Team found “regulatory processes are outdated,” 
and a PUC that is “reactive and not goal oriented… hampered by a long tradition of a standard 
approach” in which “innovation is suppressed” (Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 2, 7, 7). The report 
continues, “all processes are adversarial” and leave “no institutional capacity for collaboration” 
(Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 7). The report recommends a number of remedies for what it views as 
an outmoded and inadequate regulatory approach to modern challenges, namely adapt the PUC 
to function as “a forum that is more conducive to collaboration and less focused on litigation” 
(Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 7). Additionally, the report argues, “innovation and collaboration 
require a stable and coordinated government-supported foundation upon which the private sector 
can build” (Hatfield, et al., 2014, p. 1). 
 
Contrasting Collaborative and Adjudicative Dispute Resolution 
Collaborative approaches to dispute resolution have been used to address contentious and 
complex electric utility regulatory issues in the past and have been shown to improve utility 
regulation (Raab, 1994). In this section I will contrast collaborative and adjudicative approaches 
to dispute resolution according to three types of characteristics: basis for dispute resolution; 
process design; and process outcome. Table 1.4 summarizes the characteristics of the two 
approaches to dispute resolution. The table represents the theoretical types of collaborative and 
adjudicative processes. In practice, all processes embody characteristics of both types in varying 




Table 1.4 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 
Basis for Resolving Disputes 
Standard energy policy-making processes, such as PUC adjudication, often follow rights-
based approaches in which independent standards of fairness or legitimacy are used to evaluate a 
dispute. A third-party neutral entity presides over disputes and makes a ruling on who is right 
(Raab, 1994; Rogers, et al., 2013). In New Hampshire, the Commission acts as the neutral arbiter 
and decision maker. Rights-based approaches to dispute resolution result in positional bargaining 
(Rogers, et al., 2013). Parties come to the table with their positions already established and miss 
the opportunity to collectively brainstorm various creative approaches to both the process and the 
solutions. Parties are also likely to take extreme positions in anticipation that their opposition 
will do the same, which can obscure each party’s true interests and antagonize their opponents. 
Extreme positions also lead to costly and time-consuming negotiations in which high amounts of 
energy are devoted to achieving small concessions. Furthermore, when parties bargain over 
positions, they become attached to and defensive about positions, which limits their ability to 
consider alternatives that might equally or better satisfy their interests (Lewicki, et al., 2011; 




Characterized by integrative interest-
based negotiation 
Characterized by positional and rights-
based bargaining 
Information used as a 
common resource 
Information used to further 
each side’s position 
Process 
Design 
Process tailored by stakeholders Process prescribed, same for all cases 
Procedures position parties as joint 
problem solvers 




Produces mutual gain solutions Produces winner-take-all outcomes 
Promotes positive relationships Damages relationships 
Collaboration institutionalized Maintains silos of actors 
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Fisher & Ury, 2011). In positional bargaining, parties make no effort to understand each other’s 
interests except in order to undermine or discredit them. In traditional adversarial dispute 
resolution processes, parties often enlist their own experts to cherry pick evidence supporting 
their own positions and discrediting the positions of their opponents. Each party comes to the 
table with their own sets of facts (Matsuura and Schenk, 2017). 
In collaborative processes for dispute resolution, sometimes referred to as integrative 
negotiation or problem-solving negotiation, stakeholders begin by communicating their interests 
rather than attempting to achieve positions. This focus on interests, rather than positions, allows 
for learning and creative brainstorming of various possible solutions to satisfy interests. 
Stakeholders assign differing levels of value to different issues and trade across differences, 
rather than working to discredit the position of their opponent in order to win favor for their own 
position (Fisher & Ury, 2011). 
Emerson, et al. (2011) identifies principled engagement as one of three key aspects of 
any successful collaborative process. Principled engagement is comprised of four elements: 
discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination. Discovery refers to participants sharing 
their interests and concerns and learning about the interests and concerns of each other. Through 
sharing and learning, participants develop shared definitions of problems and can deliberate the 
key issues that the process will seek to address. Finally, discovery, definition, and deliberation 
produce initial determinations about the focus and objectives of the process (Emerson, et al., 
2011). 
Specifically in utility regulation, collaborative processes have succeeded in allowing 
parties to jointly seek out and share the best technical information and use it as a common 
resource (Raab, 1994). Joint fact-finding challenges all parties to collaboratively generate shared 
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sets of facts for decision making. There are four key steps in joint fact-finding (Matsuura and 
Schenk, 2017): 
1. Parties define information needs (i.e., data needed to make the best decision) 
2. Parties translate needs into research questions 
3. Parties partner with respected, trusted technical experts to devise and conduct research 
and study 
4. Parties jointly receive the results and consider implications. 
Joint fact-finding allows parties to use information as a common resource rather than as a 
weapon to attack one another. 
 
Process Design 
Conventional approaches to dispute resolution do not take into consideration the unique 
circumstances of each dispute but rather follow the same generic procedure regardless of the case 
(Innes & Booher, 2003). Disputants have no role in designing the approach to resolving disputes. 
Agendas tend to be prescribed by an external authority or decision maker. Rituals, routines, 
habits, and procedures of the conventional system constrain participants and stifle creativity. The 
rigid boundaries of what can and cannot be a topic of discussion limit the range of possible 
solutions (Forester, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2003; Rogers, et al., 2013; Ulibarri, 2015). 
Conventional rights-based processes limit face-to-face contact among disputants to rule-bound 
and adversarial contexts (Gray, 1989). 
Alternatively, collaborative processes are designed by the stakeholders to meet the unique 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis (Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Through 
collaboration stakeholders contribute to the designing of the process. Furthermore, the design 
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phase of the process is not a one-and-done occurrence at the beginning of the process: it is an 
iterative process of designing and redesigning. Throughout the duration of the collaboration 
stakeholders must be able to follow the conversation where it leads and not be confined by rules 
about what can or cannot be discussed or what can or cannot be changed (Innes & Booher, 
2003). The flexibility of such inclusive collaboration empowers stakeholders to tap into all of 
their knowledge and creativity in solving any number of interrelated problems rather than 
focusing on issues in isolation from one another. In utility regulation, collaboration allows 
parties to bypass confining or dated precedents and legal restrictions in favor of more practical 
and flexible solutions (Raab, 1994). Bypassing the obstacles of traditional legal process enables 
parties to jointly work out technical details at a granular level that is near impossible in contested 
cases (Raab, 1994).  
 
Process Outcomes 
Most of the research addressing environmental conflicts and environmental conflict 
resolution comes in the form of single descriptive case studies, making generalizability difficult. 
Additionally, outcomes of environmental conflicts tend to be difficult to measure (Emerson, et 
al., 2003). This is particularly true for my three case studies: because of the current nature of the 
cases there has not been sufficient time to attempt to measure the environmental outcomes of the 
decisions. Instead, I focus on stakeholder perceptions of the process and its outcomes. 
Rights-based adjudicative processes often result in winner-take-all outcomes, leaving at 
least one party feeling like the loser and thus more inclined to pursue costly appeals or litigation 
(Ury, et al., 1988; Fisher & Ury, 2011; Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Winner-
take-all results can strain or damage relationships, foster bitterness and resentment among 
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parties, and increase the likelihood of dispute recurrence (Gray, 1989; Ury, et al., 1988; Fisher & 
Ury, 2011; Rogers, et al., 2013; Schenk & Stokes, 2013). Conversely, interest-based 
collaborations allow for solutions that meet the interests of all parties, which in turn deters 
further disputes, and reduces long-term transaction costs (Ury, et al., 1988; Rogers, et al., 2013). 
Integrative bargaining creates space for positive-sum games in which one party’s gain does not 
necessitate another party’s loss (Fisher & Ury, 2011). 
Collaborative processes require that stakeholders engage with one another constructively 
and learn about each other’s interests. As participants learn about the other parties they also build 
mutual trust, understanding, and respect, and thus build positive interpersonal relationships. 
Conversely, stakeholders tend to conceal interests in adjudicative processes. Rather than 
engaging openly and freely, interactions are often relegated to formal hearings and adversarial 
courtroom settings where stakeholders are positioned as opponents, which is more likely to 
negatively impact relationships. 
In Emerson et al. (2011), a key aspect in successful collaborations is shared motivation, 
which also consists of four elements: mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and 
commitment. Here we see the beginning of relationship building, a phenomenon many have 
identified as an outcome of collaborative processes (Fisher & Ury, 2011; Forester, 1997; 
Baumann & White, 2013; Walker, et al., 2006; Innes & Booher, 2003; Rogers, et. al., 2013). 
Shared motivation has also been referred to as social capital (Emerson, et al., 2011). As 
collaborative processes build social capital among the diversity of parties engaged, they improve 
the ability of institutions to respond collaboratively to future challenges. 
 Finally, collaborative processes, and the positive impacts they can have on relationships, 
can foster new networks, organizations, forums, and institutions that continually grow and adapt 
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in a complex and changing world (Forester, 1997). As stakeholders move through collaborative 
processes, learn about each other, deliberate together, and build new relationships, they also 
begin the work of developing new institutions to support repeated use of collaborative 
governance. Stakeholders develop procedural and institutional arrangements to ensure the 
capacity and the infrastructure for continued interactions and collaborations over time (Emerson, 
et al., 2011). New institutions tend to be less hierarchical and more networked than their older, 
conventional counterparts. Flexible and networked structures empower stakeholders to challenge 
the status quo, which is essential in developing creative and innovative solutions to problems 
(Innes & Booher, 2003). 
I do not intend to suggest collaborative processes are always superior to adjudicative 
processes for reaching decisions. Adjudication has the benefits of providing all stakeholders with 
a voice and ensuring policy proposals are supported by detailed evidentiary exhibits. 
Furthermore, just because stakeholders reach agreement on a policy does not necessarily mean 
the policy is in the best interests of all stakeholders or the broader public. An adjudicator can be 
held accountable to ensure the public interest is reflected in decision outcomes, in a way 
stakeholders cannot. Finally, adjudication can limit some power imbalances that could allow a 








Research Design and Methodology 
My overarching research question is: How does the New Hampshire Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) process limit or support opportunity for collaboration? I answer this question 
by conducting an in-depth case study of the PUC as it grapples with the new policy challenges of 
distributed energy resource (DER) integration and 21st century electricity market design. To 
identify institutional opportunities and barriers, I analyze three PUC dockets: 
• DE 15-137: Electric and Gas Utility Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) 
(Chapter 2) 
• IR 15-296: Investigation into Electric Grid Modernization (Grid Mod) (Chapter 3) 
• DE 16-576: Development of New Alternative Net Metering Tariffs and/or Other 
Regulatory Mechanisms and Tariffs for Customer Generators (Net Metering) (Chapter 4) 
I selected these cases because they represent all of the PUC dockets occurring between 2015 and 
2018 that bring together utilities and DER affiliates to address policy challenges of DER 
integration. 
Case studies are an appropriate method for detailed qualitative studies of contemporary 
phenomena within their real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomena and their context are unclear (Yin, 2014). The boundary between the policy 
processes addressed in the study and the context of an evolving energy sector is murky at best, 
making the subject well suited for a case study approach. This research is a single case study 




Figure 1.6 – Timeline of EERS, Grid Mod, and Net Metering Dockets 
 
I break each docket into process stages and analyze each stage to identify collaborative 
and adjudicative characteristics. I also analyze the interaction among the individuals and 
organizations involved in the PUC policy processes. I call this organizational field New 
Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community (see Fig. 1.5, p. 20). There are two accepted 
analogies for organizational fields: the game analogy and the ecological community analogy 
(Scott, 2008). According to the game analogy, rules govern relations among players who 
compete in an arena of conflict to win stakes. According to the ecological community analogy, 
organizations existing in the same geographic space and carrying out related functions develop 
relationships and interdependencies, much as organisms in an ecosystem might develop 
competitive or symbiotic characteristics (Scott, 2008). 
Both analogies are helpful in conceptualizing New Hampshire’s energy policy-making 
community/arena. However, the game analogy is too simplistic to capture the complexities of 
21st century thinking. For this reason I prefer the ecological community analogy. I find it useful 
in reimagining the nuances of organizational relationships, the potential for a horticulturist to 
carefully coax and cultivate his garden towards a healthy symbiosis among organisms, a climax 
equilibrium. 
Figure 1.7 is a model of the PUC’s adjudicative process. The model represents the forum 
within which New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community engages in policy design. The 
May July Sept. Nov. March May 2017July Sept. Nov. March May2016 July
EERS Docket
Grid Mod Working Group
Net Metering Docket
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model can be thought of as the arena in which the players of New Hampshire’s energy policy-
making game compete to win victories over one another. Alternatively, it can be thought of as 
the ecosystem within which the organisms comprising New Hampshire’s energy policy-making 
community coexist and create structure for ecosystem functioning. For two of the three dockets 
explored in the coming chapters – the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) (Chapter 2) 
and Net Metering (Chapter 4) – the Commission employed the adjudicative process depicted in 
Fig 1.7 to design policy and resolve disputes. I use Fig. 1.7 to create detailed process maps for 
the EERS (Fig. 2.1, p. 50), Grid Mod (Fig. 3.1, p. 87), and Net Metering (Fig. 4.2, p. 107) 
dockets; the descriptions below may be useful when deciphering these process maps. Electric 
Grid Modernization (Chapter 3) is an investigative docket, not an adjudicative docket; 
investigative dockets are used to study an issue and do not follow the model of the adjudicative 
process. 
 
Fig. 1.7 – Model of the PUC Adjudicative Process 
Below are brief descriptions of each stage of the adjudicative process: 
The prehearing conference: The initial gathering of stakeholders (intervenors) and the 
Commissioners at the outset of a docket. Intervenors have the opportunity to formally comment 











Informal Meetings & Negotiations
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Testimony filing: Parties submit evidence or policy proposals for the Commission to consider 
when making its final ruling. 
Rebuttal filing: Testimony that directly addresses the testimony of other intervenors or defends 
initial testimony against criticism. 
Discovery: Intervenors subject one another other and their testimonies and rebuttal testimonies to 
written questions soliciting further information, data, etc. In addition to gathering information, 
the purpose of discovery is to build a record of evidence prior to the hearing by highlighting 
particular aspects or weaknesses in the testimony of others. 
Technical sessions: Meetings in which intervenors set procedural schedules, hear presentations 
from experts, deliberate policy options, discuss discovery and discovery responses, or address a 
wide range of other issues throughout each docket. 
Settlement conferences: The final opportunity for parties to negotiate a consensus agreement, or 
to negotiate consensus for a select number of issues prior to the hearing. Negotiations are 
confidential and in cases in which a settlement agreement is not reached, parties cannot present 
confidential settlement material as evidence in the hearing. 
Informal meetings and negotiations: Intervenors negotiate with one another outside of official 
PUC meetings. 
Hearing: The culmination of the adjudicative process. Evidence is entered into the record. Parties 
call witnesses to testify in defense of their proposals or in opposition to the proposals of others. 








Table 1.5 – Characteristics for Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes (operationalized) 
 
 
Table 1.5 combines the characteristics of collaborative and adjudicative policy-making 
processes and provides specific indicators for identifying them. I use table 1.5 to analyze 




Characterized by integrative interest-
based negotiation 
Characterized by positional and rights-
based bargaining 
Information used as a 
common resource 
Information used to further 
each side’s position 
• Identify conflict management frames using interest and position frames identified 
in the literature. Examples: 
o Interest: “We can agree on this, if you can agree that…” 
o Position: “We insist on…”; “I won’t go any lower than…” 
• Do stakeholders use information to clarify and solve problems or to support or 
undermine positions? 
• Identify intent of process component (Example: learn, brainstorm, deliberate, 
create record of evidence). 
• Identify explicit decision rules and stakeholders' decision-making goals. 
o Do parties strive to reach decisions by consensus or by prevailing? 
Process 
Design 
Process tailored by stakeholders Process prescribed, same for all cases 
Procedures position parties as joint 
problem solvers 
Procedures position parties 
as adversaries 
• Identify process as typical or unique based on participants’ perception. 
• Identify process decisions (order, function of steps) and agenda decisions (range of 
issues) as either collective, unilateral, or set by authority. 
o Example: Does process recommendation result from stakeholder dialogue 
and consensus or from only one stakeholder? 
• How do procedures organize stakeholder interactions? 
o Example: Does one party direct interaction (verbal, written) or do multiple 
parties engage in free-flowing exchange? 
Process 
Outcomes 
Produces mutual gain solutions Produces winner-take-all outcomes 
Promotes positive relationships Damages relationships 
Collaboration institutionalized Maintains silos of actors 
• Does final decision meet the interests of multiple parties or only some? 
• Identify characterization frames 
o Example: How do parties perceive their relationships or attribute blame for 
problems? 
• Are new formal or informal collaborative procedures and institutions created? 
  39
stakeholders’ discourse (verbal, nonverbal, and electronic), proposals, and proceedings through 
participant observation, document analysis, and personal interviews during each component of 
the PUC process laid out in Fig 1.7. I also analyze the outcomes of each of the three cases (a 
policy ruling by the PUC in EERS and Net Metering, and a report in Grid Mod) using Table 1.5. 
In other words, I identify characteristics listed in Table 1.5 – Characteristics of Collaborative and 
Adjudicative Processes – within each component depicted in Figure 1.7 – Model of PUC 
Adjudicative Process – to identify opportunities and barriers for collaboration within the PUC 
process. 
Although my findings are specific to New Hampshire, they may be applicable in other 
states grappling with the same energy policy challenges. Every U.S. state has an equivalent to the 
New Hampshire PUC, as does each Canadian province and territory, many U.S. territories, and 
many countries around the world. These Commissions generally serve the same function: cost-
of-service ratemaking for monopoly utility corporations. Each Commission employs some form 
of adjudication as the tool for executing cost-of-service ratemaking and other functions. More 
than half of U.S. states have EERS policies (American Council for an Energy Efficiency 
Economy, 2017); more than half of U.S. state PUCs have addressed net metering in some form 
(Advanced Energy Economy, 2017); and 37 U.S. states took some form of policy action relating 
to grid modernization in 2017 (Trabish, 2017). 
 
Data Collection 
Table 1.6 summarizes my data collection methods for each of the three cases. For the 
three dockets collectively, I conducted participant observation over an 18-month period at PUC 
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technical sessions, working group meetings, settlement conferences, and hearings, and Energy 
Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board meetings.  
I conducted 22 in-person and two telephone call in-depth interviews with stakeholders 
engaged in these energy policy-making processes (I list 30 interviews in Table 1.6 because 
several interviews addressed content for multiple dockets). Interviews are broken down by sector 
in Fig. 1.8. Interviewees represent state regulatory, energy, and environmental agencies, electric 
utility companies, business and trade associations, nonprofits, energy project developers, 
environmental advocates, and state legislators. I purposively selected stakeholders based on their 
participation in the three dockets and by using snowball sampling, meaning I asked each 
interviewee to recommend other interviewees they felt would contribute to the research. The 
personal in-depth interviews followed a semi-structured format, meaning I came to each 
interview with a set list of questions, but also allowed the interview to veer away from those 
questions in certain cases. Interviews lasted between 1 and 2.5 hours. Interviews took place at 
offices, coffee shops, and restaurants. In some instances, and with the interviewee permission, I 
digitally audio-recorded the interviews. I transcribed recorded interviews. I took either 
handwritten or typed notes immediately before, during, and immediately after each interview. 
Quotations from interviews are only attributed to individuals in cases where they gave explicit 
consent or they are public record. A sample interview protocol can be found in Appendix C. I did 
not interview PUC Commissioners. Commissioners were prohibited from engaging with me 
outside of official hearings due to my status as official intervenor in the Net Metering docket. 










Member of the 
public 
• Attended 5 EESE Board meetings 
• Attended 4 technical sessions 
• Conducted 10 interviews 




• Attended 8 Work Group meetings 
• Coordinated with Work Group members outside of meetings to 
complete homework assignments and draft language for the Final 
Grid Mod Report 
• Conducted 8 interviews 




• Attended 5 technical sessions 
• Attended 5 confidential settlement conferences 
• Attended 3 days of litigated hearings 
• Attended 1 extracurricular stakeholder meeting 
• Conducted 12 interviews 
• Reviewed documents & email communications 
 
 








 I did not interview PUC Staff representing the Electric Division. Nor did I interview 
Commissioners. My formal roles as a Working Group Member in the grid modernization docket 
and as an intervenor in the net metering docket prohibited the Commissioners from having ex 
parte communications with me. For this reason they declined to be interviewed. I was able to 
gather data regarding the perspectives of these stakeholders through participant observation and 
document reviews of their official statements. 
In addition to the three subcases of New Hampshire’s PUC policy-making processes, I 
conducted eight interviews in Berlin, Germany with experts and professionals involved in both 
Berlin’s and Germany’s energy transitions, or Energiewende. Interviewees included consultants 
involved in designing the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Germany’s legislative policy 
mechanism guiding national deployment of renewable energy technologies), experts from 
prominent German energy think tanks, and professionals employed by Berlin’s DER and utility 
sectors. Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest economy in the world, is 
widely considered a leader in the sustainable energy transition, both for its high deployment of 
wind and solar energy technologies and for its ambitious emission reduction goals (Baake, 2013; 
Laes, et al., 2014). There are significant differences between Germany’s energy policy context 
and New Hampshire’s, such as the role of the federal government and state government over the 
electric power sector, differing German and American manners of regulation of public utility 
corporations and electricity markets, and fundamental disagreements regarding the role of 
government intervention in the economy. Nevertheless, Germany grapples with similar 21st 
century energy policy challenges as New Hampshire and the rest of the United States. The 
information gathered from these interviews provided useful insights to broaden my perspective 
of 21st century energy policy challenges and solutions and is summarized in Appendix D.  
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Analysis 
I coded all documents, field notes, personal interview data, and electronic 
communications manually for recurring themes, following the approach described in Campbell, 
et al. (2013). 
Based on the variables presented in Table 1.5 I created a preliminary codebook. In the 
codebook I listed preset codes and definitions and examples for each. Examples of codes include 
“information used to attack/undermine,” “positional bargaining,” “interest sharing,” “flexible 
agenda,” and “joint problem solvers.” I initially used the codebook to code a semi-randomly 
selected transcript. Each transcript was numbered by line. I coded the transcript for both preset 
and emergent codes by bracketing a unit of data (i.e., word, phrase, sentence, paragraph) in the 
left-hand margin and writing the actual name of the code or codes for the unit of data in the 
right-hand margin. Brackets, delineated by line numbers, and codes were recorded and organized 
in an Excel workbook. 
In duplicate copies of the Excel workbook, I removed codes leaving only line-numbers 
marked by brackets representing each unit of data receiving a code. A fellow researcher coded 
the same transcript with uncoded brackets using my codebook. Code reliability was calculated by 
dividing the number of agreeing codes by the total number of data segments coded. 
After calculating inter-coder reliability the team discussed codebooks and made 
recommendations on codes and code definitions. We then discussed specific instances of coding 
disagreement and sought to reconcile differences. The discussion focused on why codes were 
selected and how they related to the literature, research designs, and the data. I revised the 
codebook iteratively, adding emergent codes, deleting codes, integrating multiple codes, 
disaggregating single codes into multiple codes, and rewriting code definitions. 
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Early inter-coder reliability testing produced 23% reliability in codes, meaning that 23% 
of coded segments were coded for the same theme by myself and by the secondary coder. After 
discussion of disagreements and revision of codebook, subsequent inter-coder reliability tests 
produced 60% reliability in coding, a high reliability according to Campbell, et al. (2013). 
*** 
 The coming chapters are organized as follows. In chapter two I provide an overview of 
energy efficiency policy and review the PUC docket process for designing an Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standard (EERS). In chapter three I provide an overview of electric grid modernization 
and review the PUC docket process investigating the topic. In chapter four I provide an overview 
of net metering and review the PUC docket process for revising the state’s net metering rate. In 
each chapter I analyze the process and outcomes for opportunities and barriers to collaboration. 
In chapter five I present a cross-case analysis, summary findings, recommendations, and a 
conclusion.  




CHAPTER II: ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARD 
 
 In this chapter I provide a brief overview of energy efficiency and energy efficiency 
policy in New Hampshire. I then provide an overview of the New Hampshire Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) docket for establishing an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS), a 
central policy for achieving statewide energy savings. Next, I describe each stage of the docket 
process in greater detail and analyze them for opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I then 
review the content of the EERS policy decision and analyze it according to stakeholder 
outcomes. I close the chapter with a discussion. 
 
What is Energy Efficiency? 
Energy efficiency means using less energy to provide the same service. Common 
examples of energy efficiency investments include replacing incandescent lighting with compact 
fluorescent lighting, replacing dated fuel-guzzling boilers with modern ones, replacing older 
energy-hungry appliances with efficiency-certified ones, and improving building envelopes with 
better insulation. Energy efficiency is a passive distributed energy resource. 
Investments in energy efficiency result in positive economic externalities. In addition to 
the monetary benefit of a quick return on investment for the individual investing in energy 
efficiency (often three to four years), there are additional benefits to the energy system, other 
ratepayers, the state economy, and the environment. Investments in energy efficiency bring down 
overall demand for energy, which reduces price by reducing overall system use and stress and 
deferring costly investments in system expansion. Efficiency helps mitigate the upward trend in 
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electricity prices for all ratepayers. Efficiency also provides environmental and public heath 
benefits by reducing air pollution (e.g., sulfur compounds, oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter, 
mercury) and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. Because of these 
positive externalities, it is the policy of the state to support energy efficiency programs. For more 
on the benefits of energy efficiency, see Lazar & Colburn (2013) and VEIC (2013). 
NHSaves is the utility-administered energy efficiency program in New Hampshire that 
distributes rebates and offers financing options for energy efficiency upgrades to qualifying 
individuals, businesses, and municipalities. The Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) is 
a policy that expands funding for existing energy efficiency programs and sets specific energy 
savings targets. 
 
Energy Efficiency Policy in New Hampshire 
Four of the six New England states rank in the top six most energy efficient in the nation. 
Of the six New England states, New Hampshire ranks least energy efficient. In 2018, it will be 
the last of the six to implement an EERS, a policy that sets binding energy savings targets for 
regulated utilities (gas and/or electric). New Hampshire’s energy savings targets under the newly 
established EERS are the least ambitious of the New England states, as illustrated by Table 2.1. 
Twenty-six U.S. states are currently implementing EERS policies and all of the top 15 energy-









Table 2.1 – New England State EE Ranking & EERS Electricity Savings Goals as of 2017 
State National EE 
Ranking 
EERS Electricity Savings Goals 
Massachusetts 
1 
















Electric savings of 20% by 2020, with incremental savings targets 




0.8% incremental savings in 2018, ramping up to 1.0% in 2019 
and 1.3% in 2020. 
Source: (ACEEE, 2017) 
 
The EERS docket differed from standard PUC adjudications in several important ways. A 
typical PUC adjudication is initiated when a regulated utility petitions the Commission and files 
a proposal to adjust its rates or take some other action that requires regulatory approval. 
Participation is generally limited to a single utility, the Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA), 
and Commission Staff. After the utility files its proposal, Staff and the OCA scrutinize the 
appropriateness of the requested action, extract further data and information through the 
discovery process, seek to resolve any disagreement through settlement negotiations, and finally 
engage in a litigated hearing to contest the proposal before the Commissioners who would make 
the final ruling. 
The EERS docket differed from the typical PUC docket in origin, participation, content, 
and process. While most dockets are initiated by a utility filing, the Commission initiated the 
EERS docket in response to repeated recommendations and numerous studies insisting that the 
state revise and improve its energy efficiency policy (GDS, 2009; VEIC et al., 2011; VEIC, 
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2013; Hatfield et al., 2013; NH OEP, 2014). The EERS drew the attention and involvement of 
significantly more parties than the typical PUC docket. Its purpose, rather than to approve or 
disapprove the actions of a single regulated utility, was to design a complex statewide policy 
affecting all three investor-owned utilities. And finally, as will be shown, the EERS process 
differed from standard PUC procedure. 
 
EERS Docket Process 
 In this section I provide a brief overview of the entire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) 
docket process for designing New Hampshire’s EERS. I then analyze each stage of the process – 
including pre-docket planning, prehearing conference, technical sessions, testimony filings, 
discovery, settlement, external negotiations, and hearings – and identify opportunities and 
barriers for collaboration within each stage of the process. 
The docket began when the Commission issued its order of notice on May 8, 2015 and 
convened a prehearing conference on June 3, 2015. Approximately 15 parties intervened 
(formally participated) in the docket. Following the prehearing conference stakeholders met in a 
series of technical sessions to hear presentations from technical experts, administrators of other 
New England EERS programs, and professionals from New Hampshire’s utilities and to discuss 
policy options. After these sessions, three stakeholder groups filed different sets of testimony: 
the joint utilities (Eversource, Liberty Utilities, and Unitil), the Electric Division Staff, and the ad 
hoc Sustainable Energy Group (New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association [NHSEA], 
Conservation Law Foundation [CLF], the Jordan Institute, Northeast Clean Energy Council 
[NECEC], and The Nature Conservancy [TNC]). Parties then conducted discovery on testimony 
filings. The joint utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group, Acadia Center, and the Office of 
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Consumer Advocate (OCA) then filed rebuttal testimony. Following testimony filings and 
discovery, the stakeholders engaged in settlement negotiations, both at official PUC meetings 
and at meetings hosted by non-PUC stakeholders. Following a settlement deadline extension, 20 
parties filed a unanimously supported EERS proposal with the Commission. A panel of 
witnesses, comprised of representatives from Liberty Utilities, Eversource Energy, Department 
of Environmental Services (DES), PUC Electric Division, Acadia Center, and NHSEA, defended 
the consensus proposal in a hearing before the Commissioners. The Commission issued Order 
No. 25,392 on August 2, 2016, approving the settlement proposal in its entirety. The order 
directs the Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board to take on a new function as 
advisory council to EERS implementation planning. Figure 2.1 maps the EERS docket process. 








Figure 2.1 – EERS Docket Process Map 
 







(Graphic is approximately temporally scaled)
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In this section I analyze each of the stages of the EERS docket process for opportunities 
and barriers to collaboration using Table 2.2. Table 2.2 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of 
my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience. 
Table 2.2 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 
Stage #1: Pre-docket Staff Investigation and EERS Straw Proposal 
The PUC began planning for an EERS over a year in advance of the adjudicated docket. 
Between 2014 and 2015 Electric Division Staff conducted an investigatory docket. Over the 
course of a year Electric Division Staff distributed a questionnaire to the various stakeholder 
groups with an interest in state energy efficiency policy and followed up by conducting one-on-
one interviews with each interested party. Interviewees included industry representatives, utility 
Core program administrators, energy efficiency product vendors, sustainable energy and energy 
efficiency advocates, relevant state agency representatives, representatives of specialist research 
institutions, Federal government agencies, and neighboring state experts. The Electric Division 
made an effort to keep an open door policy and encouraged members of the public to participate. 
Based on these efforts, the Electric Division produced an EERS Straw Proposal (NHPUC, 
2015c). 
 
 Collaborative Adjudicative 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Characterized by integrative interest-
based negotiation 
Characterized by positional and 
rights-based bargaining 
Information used as a 
common resource 
Information used to further 
each side’s position 
Process Design 
Process tailored by stakeholders Process prescribed, same for all cases 
Procedures position parties as joint 
problem solvers 
Procedures position parties 
as adversaries 
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Analysis – Process Design 
The EERS investigation did not embody characteristics of a collaborative process. The 
procedures of the investigation prevented stakeholder interaction. While a stated goal of the 
Straw Proposal was to “further advance existing discussions among various stakeholders over 
implementation of a state-wide energy efficiency resource standard (EERS)” (NHPUC, 2015c, p. 
3), the one-on-one interview format by which it was produced failed to create a free-flowing 
exchange of ideas among stakeholders. Electric Division Staff unilaterally made process and 
agenda decisions in the pre-docket investigation, which prevented stakeholders from coming 
together to discuss issues. 
Several stakeholders would have preferred a different kind of process. For example, one 
representative of a state agency would have preferred an “open stakeholder process with 
education modules” rather than the one-on-one interview format (NH Interview 3, 2016). The 
same public servant commented, in reference to the Straw Proposal process, the “biggest 
frustration… we wasted a whole year of not being able to talk as a group and bat around ideas… 
We lost a year and we could have been having some level of group discussion” (NH Interview 3, 
2016). The interviewee suggested the PUC should have enlisted a facilitator to conduct the 
process instead of relying on Electric Division Staff. 
The process of the Straw Proposal allowed Electric Division Staff to learn, but failed to 
build any capacity among the stakeholders to interact or learn from one another. Multiple 
interview respondents reported that stakeholders did not have the opportunity to come together to 
discuss the EERS and therefore felt they missed an opportunity for collective learning. Utility 
and nonutility stakeholders referred to the yearlong Staff investigation and subsequent EERS 
Straw Proposal that preceded the actual EERS docket as “not collaborative at all,” “a complete 
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failure” in which “a year was wasted” (NH Interviews 3, 4, 6, 2016). The manner in which the 
pre-docket Staff investigation was conducted limited opportunity for collaboration. 
Table 2.3 – Pre-docket Staff Investigation and EERS Straw Proposal Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute Resolution Not applicable 
Process Design Not collaborative; face-to-face interaction limited; process and agenda 
decisions made unilaterally by PUC Staff 
 
Stage #2: The Prehearing Conference: An Opportunity to Shape the Process 
The prehearing conference is the first official meeting and marks the beginning of each 
PUC adjudication. It is also the last time the intervening parties, aside from PUC Staff, will have 
any direct interaction with the Commissioners until final hearings, many months later. Strict ex 
parte rules preclude the Commissioners from participating in technical sessions or engaging with 
intervenors outside of official hearings. This feature is designed to insulate the Commissioners 
from any illicit lobbying influence and to preserve their neutrality. During the yearlong process 
between the prehearing conference and the final hearings, the Commissioners’ only source of 
information comes via official written testimony, evidentiary exhibits, and other legal filings, 
and through the counsel of their Staff who attend these meetings and interact with intervenors. 
During the prehearing conference for the EERS, Commissioner Martin Honigberg 
explicitly invited stakeholders to share preliminary positions regarding the EERS, and, more 
importantly, solicited stakeholder input about how the EERS docket should proceed (NHPUC, 
2015a). 
PUC Staff initially suggested the Electric Division take the lead in EERS policy design 
by filing an initial policy proposal (testimony) for an EERS. However, a coalition of other 
stakeholders conveyed a decidedly different vision about the best way to design an EERS. 
Representatives from the Office of Energy and Planning (OEP), DES, and CLF delivered a 
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coordinated message advocating for an alternative PUC process, one that did not begin with a 
proposal from the Electric Division (NH Interview 3, 2016; NHPUC, 2015a). 
OEP, DES, CLF, and other allies used the unique opportunity of the prehearing 
conference to engage with the Commissioners and outline an alternative to traditional 
adjudication. They suggested Electric Division Staff lacked the expertise and technical resources 
necessary to design something as complex and intricate as an EERS. They encouraged the 
Commission to seek outside assistance and tap the expert resources of organizations such as the 
Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP), Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP), and 
professionals from more experienced neighboring states. They advised the Commission to begin 
the process with educational meetings and workshops to establish a base of information, instead 
of the standard approach in which parties begin by filing competing policy proposals and 
contesting aspects of one another’s proposals. The parties suggested their alternative “creative 
approach” might better afford the group opportunity to develop one consensus-based proposal 
with the support of experts (NHPUC, 2015a). 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
The prehearing conference embodied characteristics of a collaborative process. It 
provided the stakeholders an opportunity to design the EERS docket process in a way different 
from typical PUC dockets. In contrast to the “very litigious filings” (FN., EERS, 2015) typical of 
the start of many PUC dockets, EERS stakeholders coordinated their efforts to collectively create 
a process to fit the unique circumstances of the EERS. The coalition of OEP, DES, CLF, and 
others suggested the Commission revise the order and function of the steps in the process to 
delay testimony filings and first convene a series of educational technical sessions. The coalition 
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created a process where the intended purpose of the early steps was to allow stakeholders to learn 
and to brainstorm options, rather than take positions or focus on creating a record of evidence. 
The Commissioners used the prehearing conference to invite free-flowing exchange of ideas by 
directing all intervenors present to, one-by-one, share ideas about how the process should 
proceed. The prehearing conference represented an opportunity to shape the process towards 
collaboration. 
Table 2.4 – Prehearing Conference Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute Resolution Not applicable 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders are invited to make process 
recommendations; stakeholders make process recommendations to 
create space for collective learning and deliberation 
  
 
Stage #3: Educational and Deliberative Technical Sessions 
In response to the suggestion by OEP, DES, CLF, and other stakeholders, the 
Commission began the docket with a series of educational and deliberative technical sessions. 
Stakeholders from utilities, state agencies, environmental organizations, energy efficiency firms, 
and more convened over several months to hear from experts from RAP, NEEP, the investor-
owned utilities, and administrators of efficiency programs in other New England states. Topics 
addressed in technical sessions included guiding principles and messaging, energy savings 
targets, program funding, rate structures, regulatory process, and stakeholder involvement.  
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
The educational and deliberative technical sessions embodied characteristics of a 
collaborative process. The technical sessions allowed stakeholders to engage in dialogue, share 
interests, and learn from experts and from each other. Stakeholders gathered information for the 
purpose of clarifying issues, not for the purpose of undermining each other’s positions. One 
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stakeholder felt, “[the technical sessions] helped us to get at questions like, ‘why do utilities feel 
they can’t do efficiency?’” (NH Interview 26, 2017). One DES representative described the 
technical sessions as follows: 
During numerous technical sessions, as well as some external EESE Board meetings, parties were 
able to hear from EERS experts… and administrators of other New England EERS programs, as well 
as experts from our utilities. The information imparted by these experts helped to educate all parties 
on the docket… Having the experts at the table during this whole process is what led us to all reach 
an informed group settlement. And I can’t stress the importance of that enough (NHPUC, 2016a). 
 
Stakeholders felt the addition of educational technical sessions was an essential process stage 
contributing the eventual unanimous consensus agreement. Experts assisted the stakeholders 
throughout the process, not only at discrete instances. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
One participant commented that beginning with educational technical sessions was highly 
unusual (NH Interview 4, 2016). Another commented that the technical sessions, “Increased the 
level of understanding of all participants… [and] absolutely increased my understanding…” (NH 
Interview 26, 2017). The intended purpose of the technical sessions was to learn and to “create a 
basis of information” (NHPUC, 2015a), positioning parties more as joint problem solvers and 
less as adversaries. The technical sessions provided an opportunity for stakeholders to engage in 
collective learning prior to taking formal positions. 
Table 2.5 – Technical Sessions Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute Resolution Collaborative; information and technical expertise shared among 
stakeholders to build collective understanding; parties able to 
brainstorm and share interests without formally taking positions; 
experts participated throughout process 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders agreed on process and agenda decisions; 
created space for free-flowing exchange of ideas 
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Stage #4: Testimony Filing, Discovery, and Rebuttal Filing 
 Following the educational technical sessions, three groups filed testimony: the joint 
utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group, and the Electric Division Staff. In testimony filings, 
parties take positions in the form of recommendations for how the Commission should design the 
EERS. Table 2.6 highlights some examples of the positions taken in initial testimony. 
Table 2.6 – Example Positions from Initial Testimony 




Targets as % of Sales 
for years 2017–2019 
Program Administration 




Electric Savings: 2.04% 
of sales 
Gas Savings: 2.39% of 
sales. 
Utility-administered efficiency 
programs should collaborate with 
permanent EESE Board EERS 
Advisory Council. 
Adoption of LRAM for 
initial three-year period 
to be replaced in the 
future by full 
decoupling. 
Joint Utilities 
No explicit position Utility-administered programs 
with input from EESE Board 






Electric Savings: 3.1% 
of sales 
Gas Savings: 2.25% of 
sales of sales. 
There may be benefits from 
transitioning some or all program 
delivery to a statewide program 
administrator. 
Full decoupling is 




After initial testimony, the Sustainable Energy Group, the joint utilities, Electric Division 
Staff, OCA, and Acadia Center filed rebuttal testimony. Rebuttal testimonies addressed positions 
and issues raised in the initial testimony of others. Parties may not raise new issues in rebuttal. 
All testimony and rebuttal testimony are subject to discovery requests from other parties. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
Testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal were all characteristic of adversarial, rights-
based dispute resolution. Parties took positions oftentimes in opposition to the positions of 
others. Information in testimony filings was used to shore up one’s own position in preparation 
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for the contested, adversarial hearing. The intent of testimony filing was to provide each 
stakeholder group an opportunity to present evidence in support of their position and to create a 
record of evidence in preparation for the final hearing. 
The Sustainable Energy Group’s rebuttal testimony depicted a clear effort to undermine 
and discredit the position of other stakeholders, in this case, the Electric Division. The rebuttal 
testimony called attention to the “inconsistency of the [Electric Division] Staff’s position” in 
designing calculations for program cost recovery, claiming “[Electric Division] Staff did not 
research this issue” and that “[Electric Division] Staff’s proposal includes several ‘adjustments’ 
to the calculation of lost revenue that are… either unnecessary or inappropriate” (Loiter, 2016, p. 
7, 8, 9). The author of the rebuttal testimony stated, “I have never seen an adjustment like this. I 
believe this adjustment is inappropriate and that it demonstrates a lack of understanding 
regarding energy efficiency programs and utility load forecasting” (Loiter, 2016, p. 10). One 
representative from the joint utility coalition commented that, from the point of view of the 
utilities, the Sustainable Energy Group’s rebuttal testimony was “spot on” and that the 
Sustainable Energy Group is “able to say things that the utilities can’t really say” (NH Interview 
4, 2016). Positional framing and an effort on the part of stakeholders to use information to 
undermine one another’s positions characterize this example of rebuttal testimony. Efforts were 
focused on one party prevailing over another, and not on reaching consensus. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
Testimony filings are typical of PUC adjudication. However, testimony filings are 
usually the first step in PUC adjudication. In the case of the EERS docket, stakeholders designed 
the process so that testimony filings were postponed until after deliberative and educational 
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technical sessions, and in this sense, testimony filings were characteristic of collaborative 
processes. 
The procedure of testimony filing was both collaborative and adjudicative. The three 
coalitions – the joint utilities, the Electric Division, and the Sustainable Energy Group – each 
filed a competing proposal making a case for their own vision of the final policy. In this way, 
procedures positioned parties as adversaries. However, parties who join in coalitions – as 
NHSEA, CLF, the Jordan Institute, NECEC, and TNC did (all of which are DER affiliated 
organizations) – can be positioned as joint problem solvers. 
 Rebuttal testimony is typical of traditional PUC adjudication. Procedures organize 
stakeholder interactions to be one-directional, as opposed to a multi-lateral free-flowing 
exchange of ideas. 
Table 2.7 – Testimony, Discovery, and Rebuttal Filing Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute Resolution Not collaborative; characterized by positional/rights-based bargaining; 
information used to further own position and undermine positions of 
others 
Process Design Mixed; stakeholders collectively re-ordered process steps to delay 
testimony filing until after collective learning and interest sharing; one-
directional attacks on positions, as opposed to free-flowing exchange 
 
Stage #5: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings 
After the educational and deliberative technical sessions, and in parallel to PUC 
settlement conferences convened at the PUC, sustainable energy advocates and utilities met 
outside of formal meetings to negotiate a settlement proposal.  
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
Multiple interview respondents underscored the fact that stakeholders convened informal 
meetings outside of the PUC because they felt Electric Division Staff were acting as a barrier to 
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reaching consensus (NH Interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 2016). One utility stakeholder described the 
process as, “Two ends of the spectrum [utilities and sustainable energy advocates] agreeing and 
the regulators in the middle upsetting things, making it harder to reach agreement” (NH 
Interview 5, 2016). An environmental advocate commented, “Utilities and other stakeholders had 
shared interests that PUC [Electric Division] Staff did not necessarily share, and because of this, 
there were these [informal] meetings” (NH Interview 13, 2016). The decision-making goal of 
external negotiations was to reach consensus, something stakeholders felt they were not able to 
accomplish during formal meetings. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
Utility representatives and sustainable energy advocates felt Electric Division Staff were 
making process and agenda decisions unilaterally. In response, the groups collectively made their 
own process decision to host their own meetings, thus designing their own collaborative process. 
According to one stakeholder, 
A lot of collaboration goes on not at the PUC, not at scheduled meetings. Some non-Staff 
participants in this are frustrated that we haven’t gotten further than we have, and we’ve been 
holding our own meetings to see can we put together a consensus on some major items so areas of 
litigation are reduced. A number of interveners and utilities are having sidebar conversations 
because we know we are not agreeing with PUC [Electric Division] Staff… How [Electric 
Division] Staff runs meetings is the reason others have decided to have our own meetings. 
[Electric Division] Staff hasn’t let us choose our own topics. If we have more to talk about we 
have more to talk about. [Informal negotiations] are very necessary, very productive. In two 
hours, two weeks ago [during informal negotiations], we made more progress than this whole 
process has made in five months. It is important for all parties to have conversations outside of 
formal settings (NH Interview 3, 2016). 
 
Stakeholders designed their own informal negotiations and used them as an opportunity 
to work together as joint problem solvers and thereby minimized the number of issues decided in 
the hearing. Typically, when settlement is not reached and there are competing sets of testimony, 
the hearing positions parties as adversaries where each side cross-examines witnesses in an effort 
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to discredit and undermine the positions of others. In the case of EERS, the stakeholders’ 
informal meetings allowed them to avoid the typical scenario of engaging as adversaries in the 
hearing. 
Table 2.8 – Joint Utility and Nonutility Informal Meetings Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative; intent to reach consensus; created space for free-flowing exchange 
of interests and collective learning 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders made process and agenda decisions collectively 
 
Stage #6: Settlement 
 The PUC convened a series of settlement conferences in April 2016. On April 16, twenty 
parties filed a unanimously supported settlement agreement. The settling parties include Liberty 
Utilities, Unitil, Eversource, the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, PUC Electric Division 
Staff, OCA, DES, OEP, New Hampshire Community Action Association, The Way Home, CLF, 
the Jordan Institute, Acadia Center, TRC Energy Services, New Hampshire Community 
Development and Finance Authority, and NECEC. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
The intent of settlement is to reach consensus and avoid litigation. According to one 
stakeholder, “everyone’s desire is to not have this litigated. In an ideal world, we would have a 
settlement with no litigation… no cross-examination. We would simply go to the PUC and say, 
‘here is our agreement’” (NH Interview 3, 2016).  
One utility stakeholder commented, 
[Electric Division] Staff were excluded from the settlement agreement at first in EERS. Some 
parties did not want Staff to be included in the discussions. They were frustrated with Staff, they 
felt Staff was stuck in their ways and they didn’t want to deal with them. We brought staff in at 
the end and were basically like, “here is our agreement, sign it or don’t” (NH Interview 14, 2016). 
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Multiple interview respondents perceived Electric Division Staff as rigidly clinging to 
their positions and thus convened their own settlement negotiations outside of formal meetings, 
as described previously. However, once the utility and sustainable energy advocate stakeholders 
reached agreement, they approached the Electric Division Staff using positional framing. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
One stakeholder commented, in reference to settlement conferences, “[Electric Division] 
Staff like to be in charge of [meetings], they like to control the agenda, control the questions. 
Staff like to monopolize these meetings and this give others no time to be productive. It gave us 
all a reason to have other meetings” (NH Interview 13, 2016). Some stakeholders perceived 
Electric Division Staff as making process and agenda decisions unilaterally during official 
settlement conferences.  
Table 2.9 – Settlement Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Mixed; while intent was to reach consensus, stakeholders felt formal settlement 
conferences were insufficient to share interests, learn, and reach consensus 
Process Design Not collaborative; broad stakeholder perception that Electric Division Staff 
made process and agenda decisions unilaterally 
  
 
Stage #7: Hearing 
On the day of the hearing, a witness panel comprised of representatives from Liberty 
Utilities, Eversource Energy, DES, the PUC Electric Division, Acadia Center, and NHSEA took 
the stand to testify on behalf of the unanimously supported settlement agreement. The witnesses 
explained the contents of the settlement agreement to the Commissioners. The Commissioners 
asked clarifying questions and engaged the witnesses in dialogue. 
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Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
Because of successful efforts to build a consensus, beginning in technical sessions and 
continuing through settlement and informal negotiations, parties were able to avoid the 
adversarial nature of a contested hearing. In place of the typical adversarial hearing, stakeholders 
used the EERS hearing as an opportunity to explain the details of their proposal to the 
Commissioners. The Commissioners engaged the parties with questions and dialogue for the 
purpose of learning and bettering their understanding of the agreement. At the hearing, the 
settling parties used information to clarify issues for the Commissioners, not to undermine 
anyone’s position. 
Table 2.10 – Hearing Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative (because consensus agreement reached); Commissioners asked 
questions and used information to clarify issues, not to undermine or attack 
positions 
Process Design Not applicable 
 
 
Content of the EERS Policy  
In this section I review the content of the EERS policy decision and analyze the decision 
according to whether or not it produced predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative 
processes, according to Table 2.11. Table 2.11 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my 
research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience. 
Table 2.11 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 Collaborative Adjudicative 
Process 
Outcomes 
Produces mutual gain solutions Produces winner-take-all outcomes 
Promotes positive relationships Damages relationships 
Collaboration institutionalized Maintains silos of actors 
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Some of the issues addressed in the EERS docket are: 
• Energy savings targets 
• Funding 
• Program cost recovery and utility lost revenue recovery 
• Program administration and stakeholder involvement 
• Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification (EM&V) 
The following subheadings describe each of these issues in greater detail. 
 
Energy Savings Targets 
The Commission-approved settlement agreement puts forth the following energy savings 
targets as a percentage of 2014 delivered sales: 
YEAR ELECTRIC GAS 
2018 0.80% 0.70% 
2019 1.0% 0.75% 
2020 1.3% 0.80% 
 
Efficiency savings are cumulative, meaning that by the end of the first three-year period, 
New Hampshire should have saved 3.1% of 2014 delivered electricity sales and 2.25% of 2014 
delivered gas sales. This means, according to the 2018–2020 implementation plan, that 
customers will save more than $838 million dollars in energy expenses over the initial three-year 
period of the program (NHSaves, 2017). 
 
Funding 
 The Commission-approved settlement agreement directs for ratepayer-funded energy 
efficiency programs. Efficiency programs are funded in part by a small surcharge on electric and 
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gas bills referred to respectively as the System Benefits Charge (SBC) and Local Distribution 
Adjustment Charge (LDAC). For example, prior to the EERS, Eversource electric bills included 
an SBC of 0.333 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This 0.333 cents per kWh of electricity paid by 
Eversource customers goes into a pot of money to fund rebate programs that assist energy 
consumers in covering the cost of energy efficiency upgrades. 
The EERS directs for incremental increases in Eversource’s SBC from 0.333 cents per 
kWh in 2016 to 0.850 cents per kWh in 2020 and directs similar increases for the other utilities, 
virtually doubling the funding available for energy efficiency rebates for New Hampshire 
residents and businesses. As a result, by 2020 the average Eversource residential customer 
monthly bill will increase cumulatively by $3.25 or 2.8% and the average Eversource 
commercial & industrial (C&I) customer monthly bill will increase cumulatively by $51.97 or 
3.1% in order to pay for the increase in funding (NHPUC, 2016a). 
 
Program Cost Recovery and Utility Lost Revenue Recovery 
The monies generated from the SBC are divided into three categories: 
1. The Electric Assistance Program (EAP), which provides electric bill discounts for 
income-eligible customers (0.150 cents per kWh for Eversource in 2020). The EAP 
surcharge remains unchanged by the EERS; 
2. Customer-wide energy efficiency rebate programs and their administration (0.609 cents 
per kWh for Eversource in 2020); and 
3. A Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM) to allow utilities to recover the lost 
revenue they experience due to the energy saved. In 2020, 0.091 cents per kWh paid by 
Eversource customers will compensate the company for an estimated $7.16 million in 
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lost revenues due to energy efficiency investments (Settling Parties in DE 15-137, 
2016b). 
 
Energy efficiency is the enemy of the traditional utility. Under the traditional 
regulatory/business model, energy efficiency reduces utility sales and revenues (National 
Renewable Energy Labs [NREL], 2009; National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners [NARUC], 2007; Moskovitz, 1992). This relationship between volume of 
electricity sold and revenue is called the throughput incentive and it is an important concept to 
understanding the conflict between utilities and distributed energy resource (DER) affiliates.  
In order to obtain utility buy-in for energy efficiency programs, regulators allow utilities 
to collect subsidies from ratepayers for the revenue they lose due to energy efficiency programs. 
Under New Hampshire’s EERS, utilities collect these subsidies through the LRAM referenced in 
the third bullet above. Subsidization of lost revenue is the priority issue for utilities. 
 Stakeholders designing the EERS considered two mechanisms to address utility lost 
revenue: LRAM and a decoupling mechanism. During the very first educational meeting to 
follow the EERS prehearing conference, one of the Regulatory Assistance Project’s (RAP) utility 
regulation experts gave a presentation on why decoupling was the better option to addressing 
utility lost revenue (Lazar, 2015). A decoupling mechanism makes the utility financially 
indifferent to the volume of electricity it sells, whereas LRAM does not (Moskovitz et al., 1992; 
Gilleo et al., 2015;). In a simplified example, decoupling regulates utilities so their rates 
periodically adjust (increase or decrease) according to fluctuations in actual sales. If the utility is 
under-earning, its rates increase accordingly. If the utility is over-earning, its rates decrease 
accordingly. A decoupling mechanism ensures that energy efficiency is no longer the enemy of 
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the utility (Moskovitz, 1992; NARUC, 2007; NREL, 2009). Decoupling is the “superior 
solution” to the throughput incentive (Lazar, 2015). 
Under LRAM, stakeholders estimate the amount of revenue a utility might lose due to 
investments in energy efficiency and allow the utility to collect subsidies for estimated lost 
revenue through a surcharge spread across all customers. Through this mechanism, utilities still 
experience a financial benefit from selling higher volumes of electricity and still experience 
financial losses due to lower electricity sales. The LRAM allows utilities to collect subsidies 
based on estimated energy savings, while still experiencing increased revenues from higher 
volumes of sales. Therefore, “for the utility… the way to play the [lost revenue adjustment] 
game is to maximize measured savings but not to actually save anything at all” (Gilleo et al., 
2015). Commission Staff expressed concern that “unintended windfall profits” could accrue to 
the utility as a result of the LRAM (Cunningham, et al., 2015). One stakeholder involved in the 
EERS process describes the LRAM as “heads I win, tails you lose regulation… a toss of a coin 
in which utilities are compensated for a certain level of lost revenue regardless of whether that 
revenue was actually lost” (NH Interview 9, 2016). 
 The majority of nonutility stakeholders, excluding the Electric Division of the PUC, 
advocated for a decoupling mechanism to address utility lost revenue instead of an LRAM. 
However, according to the joint utility rebuttal testimony, “full decoupling… encompasses all 
aspects of an individual distribution company’s business, not just its energy efficiency programs” 
and thus “can only properly be implemented following individual company full rate cases” 
(Davis E., et al, 2016). The settlement agreement addresses the compromise over LRAM and 
decoupling in this way: 
The Settling Parties agree that the LRAM for each utility will cease when a new decoupling 
mechanism, or another mechanism as an alternative to the LRAM, is implemented. The Settling 
Parties further agree that each of the Utilities shall seek approval of a new decoupling 
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mechanism, or another mechanism as an alternative to the LRAM, in its next distribution rate 
case following the first triennium of the EERS, 2018–2020 (Settling Parties in DE 15-137, 
2016a). 
 
Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification (EM&V) 
 The Commission will hire an independent third party to audit energy savings calculations 
and lost revenue calculations. 
 
Program Administration and Stakeholder Involvement – A New Advisory Role for the Energy 
Efficiency & Sustainable Energy Board  
 In many ways, the Commission’s ruling is only the beginning of the EERS in New 
Hampshire. The Commission-approved settlement agreement stipulates that the utilities will 
continue to administer state energy efficiency programs through NHSaves, but it also directs the 
Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board, in coordination with an expert 
consultant, to take on an advisory role to EERS implementation planning. The EERS will begin 
on January 1, 2018. 
The Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Energy (EESE) Board was established in 2008 
pursuant to RSA 125-O:5-a “to promote and coordinate energy efficiency, demand response, and 
sustainable energy programs in the state.” The Board meets monthly and is comprised of 
representatives from a broad swath of organizations.4  
A 2012 audit of the PUC and its administratively attached agencies, including the EESE 
Board, found that, “the EESE Board was not able to operate effectively, due primarily to a lack 
                                                 
4 EESE Board members include representatives from: PUC; OEP; OCA; DES; the Department of 
Administrative Services; NH Municipal Association; NH Legal Assistance; Homebuilders and 
Remodelers Association of NH; two members of the House Science, Technology, and Energy Committee; 
one member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; the Business and Industry 
Association (BIA); electric and gas utility efficiency programs; efficiency contractors; sustainable energy 
contractors; and a member of the investment community. 
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of resources and authority” and that because of these limitations, “in general had not fulfilled its 
statutory obligations” (NH LBA, 2012). In spite of the documented shortcomings of the 
volunteer board, the unanimously supported and Commission-approved EERS settlement 
agreement provides that the EESE Board take on the role of advisory council to final EERS 
design and implementation. The settlement also calls for the Commission to allocate funding to 
hire an expert consultant to assist the EESE Board in fulfilling this function. Over the course of 
2017, a newly established subcommittee of the EESE Board worked with the consultant to host a 
series of workshops and to provide input to the utilities draft program implementation plans. The 
plans will be finalized in fall 2017 and EERS implementation will begin in 2018. 
 
Analysis – Process Outcomes 
 Table 2.12 illustrates some of the issue areas and interests and positions of utility and 
DER stakeholders as they relate to these issue areas. 
Table 2.12 Partial EERS Stakeholder Assessment Table 
 Issue Area 
 Funding Lost Revenue/Cost Recovery Program Administration 
Utilities 
-Interest: Avoid lost revenue 
from energy efficiency funding 
-Position: Increase System 
Benefit Charge (SBC) to allow 
for lost revenue recovery 
consistent with energy 
efficiency funding 
PRIORITY ISSUE 
-Interest: Avoid lost revenue 
from energy efficiency 
-Position: Recover subsidies 
for lost revenue through 
LRAM 
-Interest: Retain control of 






-Interest: Maximize funding 
for energy efficiency 
-Position: Increase System 
Benefit Charge (SBC) to 
increase funding for energy 
efficiency 
-Interest: eliminate utility 
aversion to energy 
efficiency 
-Initial position: implement 
decoupling mechanism 
-Final position: Implement 
LRAM 
-Interest: Gain influence 
over program 
administration 
-Initial position: Transfer 
program administration to 
independent 3rd party 
-Final position: Establish 
stakeholder advisory board 
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Produces Mutual Gain Solutions 
The EERS policy decision was largely an integrative agreement. The agreement met 
interests of the utilities on their priority issue by allowing them to collect subsidies for lost 
revenue due to energy efficiency through the LRAM. The agreement also contains language 
directing that utilities seek approval for a decoupling mechanism, or other mechanism, following 
the first triennium of the EERS. By addressing utility concerns over lost revenue recovery with 
LRAM and including language directing future action to address perverse utility incentives with 
decoupling, the agreement meets both utility and DER interests as they relate to these two issues. 
Finally, the agreement meets priority issues of the DER stakeholders by increasing statewide 
funding for energy efficiency and by setting mandatory energy savings targets for the electric 
and gas utilities. 
The EERS process produced many of the predicted outcomes of collaborative processes. 
The ruling met the interests of all parties to a certain degree, as made apparent by the 
unanimously supported consensus agreement. However, consensus does not necessarily mean all 
stakeholder interests were equally met. Power imbalances can cause parties to arrive at 
consensus not because the agreement meets their interests to the fullest, but rather because the 
agreement is perceived as the best they can achieve considering the circumstances. 
 One example of how a power imbalance resulted in a consensus that favors some 
stakeholder interests over others has to do with ability of the utilities to shape the debate over 
whether to collect subsidies for lost revenue via LRAM or decoupling (p. 66-67). One public 
employee commented, “In [rebuttal testimonies] you see the utilities and [NHSEA] are pretty 
much in agreement related to LRAM [and in] consolidated disagreement with [Electric Division] 
Staff” (NH Interview 3, 2016). This agreement only occurred after utilities succeeded in framing 
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the negotiation by making the case that LRAM, not decoupling, would be the mechanism used 
by utilities to collect subsidies for lost revenue. The utilities successfully made the case that 
decoupling could only be addressed in a full rate case, should be excluded from the EERS 
process, and thus eliminated the priority policy option of DER affiliates from the negotiation. 
The utilities succeeded in removing decoupling as a policy option, despite many expert accounts 
that decoupling is the superior policy option (Moskovitz, 1992; NREL, 2009; Lazar, 2015; Gilleo 
et al., 2015). The ability of the utilities to shape the negotiation agenda in their own favor 
highlights the power imbalance between utilities and DER stakeholders.  
Utilities derive power from their familiarity with both the PUC process and their 
technical expertise in the details of utility regulation. In this case, the utilities’ power made them 
more effective at tailoring the agenda of the process to best suit their interests. Utilities have 
played the game of PUC adjudication for more than a century. Better still, the utilities 
constructed the game of PUC adjudication. They are the dominant, established species of the 
ecosystem. Their DER counterparts are amateurs, zealous but inexperienced and only beginning 
to understand the rules and strategies of the game. 
This particular power imbalance has important implications. The final agreement was a 
product of consensus, but only after utilities succeeded in eliminating the priority policy option 
of the DER affiliates (decoupling) from the scope of the negotiation. Because of this, while the 
final agreement is a consensus, it still meets the interests of some stakeholders more fully than 
others. Utility interest in collecting subsidies for estimated lost revenues was fully met by the 
agreement, as their preferred mechanism of LRAM was agreed upon. DER interest in 
eliminating utility aversion to energy efficiency was not fully met through LRAM. LRAM was 
necessary in acquiring utility acquiescence to increased funding for energy efficiency, a priority 
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issue for DER stakeholders, but the underlying perverse incentive for utilities to maximize 
volumetric sales, a priority issue for DER affiliates, remains unaddressed. 
 
Collaboration Institutionalized 
In accordance with predicted outcomes of collaborative processes, the EERS process 
resulted in the creation of further space for utility and nonutility stakeholders to continue to work 
together to plan for EERS implementation in the form of the new advisory function of the EESE 
Board. Many different stakeholder groups met regularly to plan for EERS implementation over 
the course of 2017, causing further integration of utility and DER actors. One stakeholder 
described the EESE Board implementation workshops as a forum where utilities, Commission 
Staff, and other interested stakeholders work collaboratively. In describing the post-docket EESE 
Board implementation-planning phase, one stakeholder commented, 
[we] worked really collaboratively with PUC Staff and utilities to host workshops and info 
sessions… The utilities were really listening to people’s thoughts and ideas on how we can take 
things from the status quo and grow them, move them in a different direction to get to the higher 
[energy] savings targets… The utilities did a fantastic job listening and participating… I think 
there is a really good working relationship between interested parties, utilities and [Commission] 
Staff (NH Interview 26, 2017). 
 
Parties perceived the outcome of the EERS docket to improve relationships among the different 
stakeholder groups by creating a new forum for cross-sector collaboration in the EERS Advisory 
Board. 
 The outcome of the EERS docket also incorporated equity considerations, thus meeting 
the interests of the Consumer Advocate and New Hampshire’s low-income communities. During 
the final hearing a representative from The Way Home, a low- and moderate-income advocacy 
organization, praised the settlement agreement for increasing the percentage of overall total 
efficiency program budget apportioned to the Home Energy Assistance Program from 15.5% to 
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17%. The increase in funding for low- and moderate-income groups is projected to result in 300 
additional low- and moderate-income homes being weatherized in the first year and an additional 
300 each year after that. The equity considerations of the settlement agreement highlight just one 
aspect of diverse stakeholders achieving their interests through the settlement (NHPUC, 2016a). 
Table 2.13 – EERS Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary 
Process Outcomes Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; met utility interests 
(obtain subsidies for lost revenue) and DER interests (increase funding for energy 
efficiency); further institutionalized collaboration between utility and DER 
stakeholders through EESE Board advisory role in implementation planning 
 
Discussion 
In many ways, the EERS process embodied characteristics of a collaborative approach to 
dispute resolution. However, the collaboration was made possible not because of any 
longstanding institutional structure, but because of concerted efforts from a coalition of 
stakeholders at the outset to redesign that process to better suit the needs of the issues at hand. 
The OEP-led coalition assisted the Commission in adapting its process to fit to the complex and 
novel circumstances of the EERS, both in formal and informal meetings. The PUC structure, 
while not inherently conducive to collaboration, proved sufficiently flexible to allow for 
stakeholders to bend it towards collaboration. 
Beginning with the prehearing conference, non-PUC stakeholders drove decision making 
that delayed proposal filings in favor of educational and deliberative meetings and the 
incorporation of expert resources which may otherwise have remained absent. The resulting 
technical sessions provided an opportunity for parties to better understand the complexities of 
utility financial incentives, and allowed utility and nonutility stakeholders to gain a better 
understanding of each other’s interests. Importantly, this learning occurred before parties took 
formal positions through testimony filings. 
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The same OEP-led coalition that took charge of shaping the process from the outset also 
convened the informal negotiations between the sustainable energy advocates and utilities. These 
external meetings were essential in creating space for the free-flowing exchange that allowed 
parties to work together towards the eventual consensus agreement. It was through these 
informal meetings between utility and nonutility stakeholders that the parties came to reach the 
unanimous consensus agreement. 
Table 2.14 – Summary of Characteristics of EERS Docket Stages 
 






Not collaborative; face-to-face 
interaction limited; process and agenda 





Collaborative; stakeholders are invited 
to make process recommendations; 
stakeholder process recommendations 
create space for collective learning and 
deliberation 
Technical Sessions Collaborative; information and technical 
expertise shared among stakeholders to 
build collective understanding; parties 
able to brainstorm and share interests 
without formally taking positions 
Collaborative; stakeholders agreed on 
process and agenda decisions; created 





Not collaborative; characterized by 
positional/rights-based bargaining; 
information used to further own position 
and undermine positions of others 
Mixed; stakeholders collectively re-
ordered process steps to delay 
testimony filing until after collective 
learning and interest sharing; one-
directional attacks on positions, as 
opposed to free-flowing exchange 
Joint Utility and 
Nonutility External 
Meetings 
Collaborative; intent to reach consensus; 
created space for free-flowing exchange 
of interests and collective learning 
Collaborative; stakeholders made 
process and agenda decisions 
collectively 
Settlement Mixed; while intent was to reach 
consensus, stakeholders felt formal 
settlement conferences were insufficient 
to share interests, learn, and reach 
consensus 
Not collaborative; stakeholders 
perceived Electric Division Staff as 
making process and agenda decisions 
unilaterally 
Hearing Collaborative (because consensus 
agreement reached); Commissioners 
asked questions and used information to 
clarify issues, not to undermine or attack 
positions 
Not applicable 
   
 
 Energy Efficiency Resource Standard  
 
 75
One emergent finding was the widespread dissatisfaction stakeholders felt towards 
Electric Division Staff of the PUC. Many stakeholders felt Electric Division Staff were neither 
equipped with the appropriate technical knowledge nor the appropriate facilitation skills to 
successfully manage the EERS docket process and steer the group towards a consensus 
agreement. Stakeholders from utilities, sustainable energy advocates, and state agencies alike 
repeatedly called attention to what they perceived to be the Electric Division’s inability to 
successfully guide a collaborative and inclusive policy-making process, beginning with the pre-
docket straw proposal and continuing through technical sessions, testimony filing, and settlement 
conferences. Stakeholders perceived formal PUC meetings led by the Electric Division as a 
barrier to reaching the collective goal of consensus and thus circumnavigated them through joint 
external meetings. 
The EERS process is also suggestive of a power imbalance among the stakeholder 
groups. Utilities, being more familiar with the process and technical details of the PUC arena, 
succeeded in eliminating decoupling, a priority policy option for DER affiliates, from the 
negotiations. Power differentials can cause some stakeholder groups to be more or less effective 
at tailoring process agendas to suit their needs. 
 Finally, the outcomes of the EERS docket were concurrent with the predicted outcomes 
of collaborative processes. The interests of all stakeholders were satisfied to a high degree: 
utilities obtained LRAM subsidies for lost revenues and DER stakeholders obtained increased 
funding for efficiency and mandatory energy savings targets. While interests of DER 
stakeholders could have been better satisfied if the underlying perverse utility incentive to 
maximize volumetric sales were eliminated through a decoupling mechanism, they at least 
succeeded in including language in the decision that directs utilities to seek decoupling approval 
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following the first EERS triennium. Additionally, the final ruling directed for further 
collaboration between utility and DER stakeholders through the EESE Board advisory role in 
EERS implementation planning, further institutionalizing a collaborative approach to decision 
making. 
The EERS docket represented an early attempt to shift the standard adversarial PUC 
adjudication towards a more collaborative approach better suited to address the challenges of 21st 
century electricity market design. But the collaborative path came about not as a product of the 
Commission’s standard institutionalized procedure, but as a result of non-PUC leadership 
working to help the Commission redesign its process. The EERS process was successful in 
producing a consensus agreement because of the leadership of the individuals who were 
dedicated to corralling the broad range of viewpoints into one unanimously supported policy 
proposal. Stakeholders from across the spectrum, from public servants to utility managers to 
sustainable energy advocates, were dedicated to working together to build consensus and avoid 
litigation. 
 The EERS docket was a learning process for many stakeholders who came into the 
docket with varying degrees of experience and knowledge about both the PUC and the nuances 
of utility regulation. Many of the stakeholders who engaged in the EERS docket went on to 
participate in grid modernization (chapter 3) and net metering (chapter 4) dockets. 
As will be shown in the coming chapter, the investigation into grid modernization lacked 
a similar commitment by stakeholders to reach across sectors to build consensus, especially 
outside of official working group meetings. While a collaborative process in name, the final grid 
modernization report is replete with contradictory recommendations highlighting the inability of 
the group to reach consensus on what grid modernization means for New Hampshire. 
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CHAPTER III – ELECTRIC GRID MODERNIZATION 
 
Traditional cost of service regulation… is unlikely… to capture potential benefits from grid 
modernization for consumers and society. 
 –(Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2017, p.75) 
 
 
 In this chapter I provide an overview of electric grid modernization and explain some of 
the topics addressed by the Grid Modernization Working Group. I then provide an overview of 
the PUC docket process for investigating the topic of electric grid modernization. Next, I 
describe each stage of the investigative docket in greater detail and explain some of the concepts 
of grid modernization. I analyze each stage of the grid modernization investigation for 
opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I then analyze the outcome of the docket, the final 
grid modernization working group report, according to stakeholder outcomes. I close the chapter 
with a discussion. 
 
What is Electric Grid Modernization? 
Electric grid modernization aims to fundamentally remake the utility regulatory model so 
it may better facilitate the value-based proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs). It is 
about making the electric grid more competitive and efficient. This goal can be accomplished by 
using new technologies to empower customers to reduce their energy costs while simultaneously 
reducing overall electric system costs.  
Under the current regulatory structure the monopoly utility alone is responsible for 
electric grid planning and for making investments in electric system upgrades. However, with the 
advent of DERs, new players are vying for a chance to compete to make investments that add 
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value to the electric grid. These investments cover the range of DERs – from distributed solar, to 
battery storage, to management of electricity demand – but in order to capture the value of these 
resources, new regulatory approaches are needed. Utilities are unlikely to invest in grid 
modernization because, even though it may be the cheapest, most efficient option for electric 
system planning, it is often counter to their financial wellbeing (Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory [LBNL], 2017).5 
Two of the main categories of grid modernization topics laid out in the PUC order on 
scope and process and addressed by the grid modernization working group are: 
(1) Utility cost recovery and incentives; and 
(2) Customer engagement with DERs (including rate design, data issues, and customer 
education). 
In this section I will first explain why traditional utility financial incentives are antithetical to 
grid modernization. I will then discuss issues of grid modernization through customer 
engagement with DERs, and more specifically (1) issues of utility and customer data; and (2) 
issues of time-variant rate (TVR) design. 
The New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group spent considerable time and 
resources addressing issues of customer engagement with DERs, which makes up 16 pages of 
content in the report. Conversely, sections addressing distribution system planning and utility 
cost recovery make up a combined five pages of content in the report. For this reason, I will 
focus more attention on the issue of customer engagement with DERs. 
 
                                                 
5 Recall the throughput incentive (the incentive for the utility to increase volume of sales). This is one of 
the components of the traditional regulatory model that prevents the utility from embracing grid 
modernization. Decoupling is therefore a key component of grid modernization, but because decoupling 
was addressed in the EERS settlement it was not addressed by the Grid Modernization Working Group 
(Chapter 2, p. 65–68). 
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Utility Cost Recovery and Financial Incentives 
In order to understand the challenge of grid modernization, it is important to first 
understand the perverse financial incentives of the traditionally regulated utility. 
According to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories [LBNL], 2017, p. 75, “financial 
incentives for regulated utilities are misaligned with public policies... traditional regulation does 
not incent utilities to support increased customer sovereignty.” Again, customer sovereignty, or 
customer engagement and empowerment through access to DERs, was the major focus of the 
New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group, the idea being that customers can be 
empowered to adopt new technologies to reduce their own costs and to optimize the electric grid. 
The problem is that increased customer sovereignty in this sense is antithetical to the utility’s 
bottom line under traditional regulatory approaches. 
The most apparent perverse utility incentive is the throughput incentive, or the direct 
positive relationship between volumetric sales of electricity and utility revenue (chapter 2, p. 66). 
Another perverse utility incentive is a colloquially referred to as the incentive to gold plate the 
rate base. Because of its regulated monopoly status, the utility has a financial incentive to 
engage in excessive capital accumulation and to increase capital expenditures above 
economically efficient levels (Averch & Johnson, 1962; NHPUC, 2016b). This is because the 
utility’s rate of return is set by central planning regulation and not by market forces. The 
regulators set a rate of return for the utility, and the utility then generates that rate of return on 
the value of its rate base. The rate base comprises all of the assets the utility owns for which it 
receives a regulated return on investment. The rate base may be comprised of power plants, 
transmission lines, substations, distribution poles and wires, meters, etc. The higher the total 
value of the utility’s rate base, the greater its earnings. Thus the regulatory trope: gold plating the 
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rate base. If the utility invests in gold-plated substations, the value of its rate base will increase 
and so will its earnings. The incentive is formally known as the Averch-Johnson (A-J) effect. 
Because of the A-J effect, it is counter to the financial interests of the utility to 
accommodate third party DERs as alternative solutions to grid needs, regardless of the ability of 
such alternatives to meet grid needs at competitive costs. If DERs can offset the need for the 
utility to make large capital expenditures on rate base expansion, the utility loses out on an 
opportunity to increase its earnings (NHPUC, 2016b). One can imagine a case in which demand 
management, energy efficiency, distributed generation, or energy storage, empowered through 
economically accurate price signals, might displace the need for a utility to invest in traditional 
poles and wires grid expansion (e.g., substation upgrade, transmission extension). However, it is 
against the financial interests of the utility to support these non-wires alternatives that offset the 
opportunity for it to grow its rate base. The challenge of grid modernization is aligning the 
financial incentives of utilities and third party DER providers so the deployment of DERs is 
beneficial to the utility, the third-party, the user, and the grid as a whole. 
 
Customer Engagement with DERs (Data Issues and Rate Design) 
The PUC order on scope and process emphasized customer engagement and suggested 
customers can be educated and empowered to reduce both their own energy costs and overall 
system costs through smart metering technology, access to real-time information, and DER 
integration (NHPUC, 2016b). Third-party access to utility and customer data and time-variant 
rates (TVR) are the two main customer engagement approaches addressed by the New 
Hampshire grid modernization working group. These two issues are also the source of the most 
disagreement between utility and nonutility stakeholders. 
Electric Grid Modernization 
 81
Data Issues 
DER providers and utilities have conflicting interests when it comes to data collection 
and sharing issues. DER providers want to compete with utilities to make distribution system 
investments, but in order to do so they require equal access to utility data (see policy challenge 
#6, p. 17). Table 3.1 from the final Grid Modernization Report (and originally from a SolarCity 
white paper) (SolarCity, 2016)) illustrates the types of data DER providers seek access to. 
SolarCity – represented by the Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA) in both the grid 
modernization and net metering dockets – contends that if DER providers, such as itself, have 
access to temporal and geographic data about utility distribution systems (i.e., daily, monthly, 
annual electricity demand/load profiles of individual segments of the distribution system 
(circuits/feeders)), then they will be able to deploy DERs to meet distribution system needs more 
cost effectively than traditional utility investments. 
Table 3.1 – Data to Foster Engagement in General Grid Design and Optimization 
Data Need Description 
Circuit Model The information required to model the behavior of the grid at the location of grid 
need. 
Circuit Loading Annual loading and voltage data for feeder and SCADA line equipment (15 min 
or hourly), as well as forecasted growth 
Circuit DER Installed DER capacity and forecasted growth by circuit 
Circuit Voltage SCADA voltage profile data (e.g., representative voltage profiles) 
Circuit Reliability Reliability statistics by circuit (e.g., CAIDI, SAIFI, SAIDI, CEMI) 




The current and planned equipment ratings, relevant settings (e.g., protection, 
voltage regulation, etc.), and expected remaining life. 
Area Served by 
Equipment 
The geographic area that is served by the equipment in order to identify assets, 
which could be used to address the grid need. This may take the form of a GIS 
polygon. 
Source: Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017 
Utilities tend to disagree with the premise that entities other than they should have much 
to do with making distribution system investments, as exhibited by the following excerpt from 
Unitil’s comments submitted after the final Grid Modernization Report: 
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Unitil sees itself as responsible for implementing enabling technologies supporting both 
traditional electric company operations and new smart grid capabilities… Unitil’s business model 
is changing in order to become an ‘enabling platform’ supporting diverse activities by third 
parties and electricity customers… A fundamental premise in the development of this reliable 
system is that one entity, the utility, is responsible for its planning. While traditional utility 
planning will evolve to incorporate new technologies, new services and the input and needs of 
new stakeholders… the planning, design and operation of the distribution system is the 
responsibility of the utilities and needs to remain as such (Epler, 2017). 
 
 Unitil’s comments highlight one of the central challenges of grid modernization: who will 
be able to partake in the planning and deployment of DERs, to what degree, and in what form? In 
one breath, Unitil assures the Commission that the company is becoming “an ‘enabling platform’ 
supporting diverse activities by third parties and electricity consumers” while firmly maintaining, 
“one entity, the utility, is responsible for… the planning, design and operation of the distribution 
system” (Epler, 2017). The counterargument from SolarCity and other DER providers is that the 
utility can only become an enabling platform by empowering third parties and electricity 
consumers to participate in the planning, design, and operation of the distribution system by 
providing access to utility data. 
 
Rate Design 
If utility customers could be persuaded through price signals to reduce their consumption 
(or to shift consumption to off-peak hours), then existing plants could better serve their 
needs. New construction could be delayed, perhaps defeated altogether. 
–Thomas K. McCraw (1984) 
 
 The second key to grid modernization through customer empowerment is rate design, 
specifically, time-variant rate (TVR) design. TVR is not a novel concept in utility regulation, but 
the emergence of DERs has brought the TVR debate back to center stage. 
 Amidst the energy crisis of the 1970s, economist Alfred E. Kahn, the newly appointed 
Chair of New York’s Public Service Commission, famously responded by implementing TVR to 
more accurately communicate to energy consumers the real costs of their consumption. In place 
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of typical flat rates (rates that remain unchanged regardless of demand at the time of 
consumption) Kahn established time-of-day price differentials with ratios as high as 12:1. 
Electricity was priced at 3.5 cents/kWh on a normal summer day, 2.5 cents/kWh during the 
night, and 30 cents/kWh on hot days summer days when demand for air-conditioning 
skyrocketed. Until this incorporation of economically accurate price signals, gluttonous demand 
for artificially cheap air-conditioning drove significant system cost increases, as it required 
utilities to invest in expensive system expansion (McCraw, 1984). 
 The point of TVR is to communicate to consumers, and particularly peak-time users, the 
reality of the costs they impose upon the system and to reward off-peak users for helping to 
realize a higher economic efficiency in overall system usage. In the time of Kahn, these price 
signals applied only to consumption of electricity. Today, the same principles can be applied to 
the distributed generation of electricity and across the plethora of DERs. For example, in the 
same way Kahn used TVR to communicate the cost of peak-time energy consumption, TVR can 
also be used to communicate the value of peak-coincident distributed generation and the services 
of other DERs. The challenge lies in designing TVR that address utility cost recovery concerns 
and create a value-based DER marketplace.6, 7 
*** 
Three of the core issues of grid modernization are: (1) perverse utility financial incentives 
that make grid modernization antithetical to the current utility bottom line; (2) access to utility 
and customer data as a necessary component of grid modernization; and (3) how time-based rate 
                                                 
6 Remember, because of the throughput incentive (Chapter 2, p. 66) utilities “want” to grow demand, and 
because of the A-J effect (Chapter 3, p. 79–80), utilities “want” to accumulate excessive capital through 
system expansion. 
7 Recall, states used real-time pricing and access to transmission infrastructure to make bulk generation 
and wholesale electricity markets competitive and more economically efficient. Similar principles apply 
to distributed generation, distributed energy resources, and retail electricity markets (Chapter 1, p. 9–12) 
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design for consumption, distributed generation, and energy management can empower grid users 
to realize a more efficient and competitive marketplace. Table 3.2 illustrates utility and DER 
interests as they relate to these three issue areas. 
Table 3.2 – Partial Grid Modernization Stakeholder Assessment Table 
 Issue Area 
 Utility Incentives and 
Cost Recovery 
Data Issues Rate Design 
Utilities 
PRIORITY ISSUE  




to utility revenue; new 
business models are 
risky and uncertain 
Interest: Minimize time 
and resources for data 
collection and sharing  
Position: Distribution 
system planning should be 
responsibility of utility 
alone; 3rd-party 
investments remove profit 
opportunity 
Interest: Know effect on 
utility revenue 
Position: Using coincident 
and non-coincident peaks 
to inform TVR is 
complicated 
-Closely tied to utility 





competitive markets for 
retail energy services 
Position: Traditional 
incentives antithetical to 
DER integration 
PRIORITY ISSUE  
Interest: Foster 
competition, consumer 
choice, and grid efficiency 
Position: Data collection 
and sharing are needed 
PRIORITY ISSUE  




Position: TVR will 
stimulate markets for DER 
 
 The issues of most importance to utility stakeholders are utility incentives and cost 
recovery, which dictate utility profitability. The priority issues for DER affiliates are data 
collection and sharing issues and rate design issues, because DER affiliates believe data driven, 
time-based rates will animate markets for their services. An integrative agreement is one that 
would allow utilities to achieve their interests in cost recovery, while also allowing DER 
affiliates to achieve their interests regarding data and rate design. However, as will be shown, 
utility and DER stakeholders were unable to reach an integrative agreement that allowed each to 
achieve their interests on their priority issue. 
In the coming section I will analyze each stage of the Grid Modernization Working 
Group process – including pre–working group planning and data gathering; working group 
Electric Grid Modernization 
 85
meetings (technical sessions); joint utility and nonutility informal meetings; and separate utility 
and nonutility caucusing – and identify opportunities and barriers for collaboration within each 
using Table 3.3. Table 3.3 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38, of my research design and is 
repeated here for the reader’s convenience. 
Table 3.3 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 
Electric Grid Modernization Docket Process 
 In many ways, the New Hampshire grid modernization investigation built upon the 
foundation laid in Massachusetts several years prior. The Massachusetts working group 
embodied one of the first attempts in the U.S. to define the scope of grid modernization and 
started from a virtually blank slate. 
The New Hampshire grid modernization docket was an investigative docket, as opposed 
to an adjudicative docket, making it different from the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard 
(EERS) docket (Chapter 2) and Net Metering docket (Chapter 4). The EERS and Net Metering 
adjudicative dockets, through testimony filings, settlement negotiations, and litigated hearings, 
produced official rulings setting forth imminent and impactful policy. In contrast, the grid 
modernization investigation took the form of a collaboratively facilitated working group and 
produced a report with policy recommendations. Unlike adjudicative dockets, investigations do 
not result in any policy changes. Investigations are solely for the purpose of studying an issue. 




Characterized by integrative interest-
based negotiation 
Characterized by positional and rights-
based bargaining 
Information used as a 
common resource 
Information used to further 
each side’s position 
Process 
Design 
Process tailored by stakeholders Process prescribed, same for all cases 
Procedures position parties as joint 
problem solvers 
Procedures position parties 
as adversaries 
Electric Grid Modernization 
 86
Because the grid modernization docket was an investigation and not an adjudication, its process 
does not conform to the model of a PUC process depicted in Figure 1.7 in Chapter 1 (p. 36). 
House Bill 614 directed the PUC to open a docket on electric grid modernization. 
Between August 2015 and April 2016 the PUC collected data and comments from interested 
stakeholders on grid modernization. The PUC incorporated information from this pre-docket 
stage into the subsequent order on scope and process for the docket. The PUC also enlisted 
consultants Raab Associates and Synapse Energy Economics to facilitate the forthcoming 
working group process.  
Seventeen organizations and individuals submitted requests to participate in the grid 
modernization working group and all requests were granted. Investor-owned utility participation 
was required. Between April 2016 and February 2017, facilitators Raab Associates and Synapse 
Energy Economics convened eight official working group meetings (which are, for all intents 
and purposes, the same as technical sessions). Stakeholders also convened in ad hoc groups 
outside of official working group meetings to draft recommendations and language for the report. 
Some ad hoc meetings convened both utility and nonutility stakeholders. The majority of ad hoc 
meetings consisted of separate utility and nonutility caucusing. Raab Associates submitted the 








Figure 3.1 – Electric Grid Modernization Docket Process Map 
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Stage #1: Pre–Working Group Planning and Data Gathering (August 2015 – March 2016) 
The first step in the New Hampshire grid modernization process was for the Commission 
to solicit stakeholder input on the definition and elements of the subject through written 
comments. Twenty-three organizations and individuals submitted written comments for the 
PUC’s consideration. 
The Commission also issued a round of discovery to the investor-owned utilities, 
soliciting information regarding the automation and communication capabilities of their metering 
and distribution systems (number and percent of smart meters, automated substations, etc.). The 
utilities (Eversource, Unitil, and Liberty) complied with the discovery requests. 
In April 2016, the Commission, in partnership with consultants Raab Associates and 
Synapse Energy Economics (who had previously facilitated the Massachusetts grid 
modernization working group), authored and issued a detailed order on scope and process for the 
docket and invited stakeholder participation in the working group. Information from discovery 
requests was included in the Commission’s order on scope and process and shared publicly. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
This stage of the process embodied characteristics of a collaborative process in that 
information was collected to be used as a common resource, and not to further any one 
stakeholder’s position or undermine the positions of others. The Commission collected 
information from interested parties through the comment process with the intent of using the 
information to inform the scope and process of the working group. Importantly, the Commission 
also collected information using the discovery process to determine what the current utility 
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infrastructure was capable of accommodating in terms of grid modernization and shared the 
information among all interested parties. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
During the pre–working group planning and data-gathering phase the Commission and its 
consultants made agenda decisions after soliciting input from all interested parties, as is 
characteristic of a collaborative process. However, the procedures of the pre-investigation 
planning and data-gathering phase organized stakeholder interactions as one-directional. 
Stakeholders did not have an opportunity to meet face-to-face and engage in dialogue. 
  
Table 3.4 – Pre–Working Group Planning and Data Gathering Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative; collected information from interested stakeholders to inform scope 
and process; Commission shared information among stakeholders to be used as 
common resource 
Process Design Mixed; Commission invited input regarding process agenda, but no opportunity 
for face-to-face dialogue among stakeholders 
  
 
Stage #2: Working Group Meetings (Technical Session) (April – February 2016) 
Consultants Raab Associates and Synapse Energy Economics facilitated eight daylong 
New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group meetings (technical sessions). Table 3.5 
lists the membership of the Grid Modernization Working Group. See Appendix  
In initial meetings of New Hampshire’s grid modernization investigation stakeholders 
were encouraged to brainstorm ideas about how they could build upon the foundation laid by the 
Massachusetts process. Early meetings also consisted of presentations from various stakeholder 
groups including the utilities, New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and 
Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA). Stakeholders engaged in dialogue, shared their 
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interests, and deliberated in an effort to reach consensus on the many facets of grid 
modernization. 
Table 3.5 – New Hampshire Grid Modernization Working Group Members 
Organization / Individual Category of Actor 
Acadia Center DER Affiliate 
City of Lebanon, NH DER Affiliate 
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) DER Affiliate 
Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA) DER Affiliate 
Eversource Energy Utility 
Liberty Utilities Utility 
New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) State Agency 
New Hampshire Legal Assistance Low Income Advocate 
New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning (OEP) DER Affiliate 
New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA) State Agency 
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission Staff (ex officio) State Agency 
New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA) DER Affiliate 
Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP) DER Affiliate 
Patricia Martin, Retired Engineer DER Affiliate 
Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA)/Direct Energy Competitive Supplier 
Revolution Energy DER Affiliate 
The Jordan Institute DER Affiliate 
Unitil Energy Systems Inc. Utility 
 
In between each of the first several meetings stakeholders were asked to complete 
homework assignments designed to identify different stakeholder interests. The facilitators 
compiled stakeholder interests into tables to share with the entire group to illuminate potential 
areas of agreement and disagreement. Facilitators then worked to reconcile disagreements during 
working group meetings. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
The goal of the Grid Modernization Working Group, according to the ground rules laid 
out by Raab Associates and agreed to by all working group members, was to “make substantive 
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recommendations by unanimous agreement (i.e., consensus) of the Working Group members 
(organizations) where possible” (Raab, 2016), as is characteristic of collaborative processes. 
Utilities and DER affiliates mixed interest and positional framing throughout working 
group meetings. For example, when addressing rate design and TVR, stakeholders individually 
completed homework assignments designed to discover different parties interests as they related 
to TVR. The working group facilitators compiled rate design interests in matrices and shared the 
matrices with the entire working group to be discussed. During working group meetings, 
facilitators worked to translate those interests into consensus recommendations for the report, but 
were often unable to do so. 
The rate design section of the final Grid Modernization Report contains ten sets of 
dissonant recommendations labeled “utility recommendation” and “nonutility recommendation” 
(see Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017, p. 13–23). Below is an example of one such 
opposing recommendation: 
Utilities: Time-Variant Rates (TVR) for distribution services is not practical to implement, 
because distribution costs do not vary with time of use. 
  
Nonutility Stakeholders: Time-Variant Rates (TVR) [for distribution services] using simple on-
peak and off-peak [Time of Use] periods should be implemented for all customers in the near 
future (Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017). 
 
TVR design must take into consideration costs associated with energy demand and the 
benefits associated with DERs that can manage that demand. These costs and benefits apply 
differently to energy supply (generation), the transmission system, and the distribution system.8 
Much of the utility cohort takes the position that there is no time-of-use benefit or cost to the 
distribution and transmission systems. All other stakeholders take the position that there are 
time-of-use benefits to the transmission and distribution system associated with DERs. 
                                                 
8 Figure 4.3, p. 117 is useful in understanding how utility rates are divided among these categories of 
costs. 
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Working group meetings were characterized by sharing of interests in an effort to 
reconcile them and reach consensus recommendations. When interests could not be reconciled, 
parties reverted to opposing positions.  
  
Analysis – Process Design 
The open dialogue format of working group meetings allowed stakeholders to engage in a 
free-flowing exchange of ideas and interests and thus positioned the parties as joint problem 
solvers. During early meetings, utility and nonutility stakeholders alike agreed by consensus to 
expand the list of desired grid modernization outcomes established by Massachusetts. For 
example, the New Hampshire Working Group included “customer engagement and 
empowerment” as a desired grid modernization outcome. This new and collectively agreed upon 
outcome then became the central focus of the entire working group process. In this way, 
stakeholders collectively made agenda decisions, as is characteristic of a collaborative process. 
 
Table 3.6 – Working Group Meetings (Technical Session) Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative; intent of process was to achieve consensus; experts enlisted to 
facilitate interest sharing; parties brainstormed, engaged in dialogue, shared 
interests; parties reverted to positional bargaining only when interests could not be 
reconciled 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders collectively made agenda decisions 
 
Stage #3: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings 
During the working group process there were at least two instances of utility and 
nonutility stakeholders collaborating outside of official working group meetings to draft 
consensus language for the report. In one instance, representatives from the Northeast Clean 
Energy Council (NECEC) and Eversource worked together to draft language regarding utility 
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cost recovery and incentives. However, this section of the report is vague and lacks substantive 
recommendations. This is in part due to the way utility incentives were addressed in the EERS 
ruling. The EERS ruling directs utilities to recover lost revenue from efficiency through the 
LRAM and further directs utilities to consider decoupling after the first triennium of the EERS 
(see Chapter 2, p. 65–68). Because of this, utilities argue that the topic of correcting perverse 
utility incentives is outside the scope of the grid modernization discussion. 
A second instance of joint utility and nonutility external collaboration occurred in the 
form of a volunteer subgroup task force on data issues. This task force met outside of official 
meetings and reached consensus language on principles of utility and customer data. Task force 
membership was self-selected and included both utility and DER affiliated stakeholders. Table 
3.7 shows the data task force membership. 
Table 3.7 – Grid Mod Data Task Force Membership 
David Littell (facilitator) Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) 
Melissa Birchard Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) 
Brianna Brand New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA) 
Jim Brennan Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) 
Justin Eisfeller Unitil 
Kate Epsen New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA) 
Todd Griset Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA) 
Mark Hanks Direct Energy 
Pat Martin Retired Engineer 
Kevin Sprague Unitil 
 
The data collection task force reached consensus on final report language pertaining to 
“Customer and Utility Data Principles,” which include: 
1. Sharing of data with the market (including third-party providers) can encourage market 
competition for the provision of advanced energy technologies. 
2. In general, use of standards and protocols for data sharing can facilitate interoperability, 
empower third parties, and provide the opportunity for customers to reduce their costs or 
system costs. (Examples of data standards include: Standard Energy Services/Usage Data, 
Green Button, and “Connect My Data.”) 
3. Security is an inherent risk related to the sharing of customer data and must be addressed. 
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4. Interval data enables time varying rates, demand response, innovation, and can allow third-
party service providers the opportunity to offer ways to reduce system costs, or for customers 
to reduce their own costs. 
5. Aggregated customer information can be made available if certain protocols to protect 
individual customer usage and identity are adopted. 
6. Individual customer data should be made available consistent with the requirements and 
protections set forth in RSA 363:38. 
7. An individual customer is always free to share the customer’s data with third parties, but 
utilities and third parties should take care to make customers aware of the risks created by 
such sharing (Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017). 
 
 While the data task force was successful in crafting consensus principles on utility and 
customer data, the working group as a whole was unable to reach consensus on many specific 
data recommendations. Where interests could not be reconciled to produce consensus language, 
the utility and nonutility stakeholders composed their own recommendations in which they 
defined their positions, but also explained the reasoning and interests behind those positions (See 
Grid Modernization Working Group, 2017, p. 25–26). 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
Utilities and DER affiliates mixed interest and positional framing when discussing data 
collection, access, and usage issues. Compiling the data requested requires intensive time and 
resources from the utilities and, thus, they view it as against their interests to do so. Additionally, 
as previously discussed, it may be damaging to the utility bottom line if third parties can take 
data and use them to invest in grid optimization. This combination of utility interests predisposes 
utilities to take the position articulated in Unitil’s post-report comments: it is the perogative of 
the utility, and only the utility, to plan, design, and invest in distribution system upgrades. 
 Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the DER affiliates to obtain access to utility data 
because they believe the data would allow them to calculate more accurately the value their 
resources provide to the grid, thus allowing them to expand investment and growth opportunities 
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for their businesses. DER affiliates, therefore, take the position that utilities should collect and 
disclose temporal and geographic data about electricity usage across the electric distribution 
system.  
 
Analysis – Process Design 
The procedure of a volunteer task force meeting outside of official meetings positioned 
the stakeholders as joint problem solvers and resulted in consensus language regarding data 
principles. The task force convened at the recommendation of the facilitator, but membership 
was self-selected and in this way the task force was tailored by the stakeholders, as is 
characteristic of a collaborative process. 
Table 3.8 – Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative; intent to share interests and learn with goal of consensus; when 
interests cannot be reconciled stakeholders revert to positional bargaining 
Process Design Collaborative; process decisions made collectively by group; group membership 
self-selected and representative of major stakeholder perspectives 
 
Stage #4: Separate Utility and Nonutility Caucusing Outside Formal Meetings 
Towards the end of the process, nonutility and utility stakeholders caucused separately 
outside of official working group meetings in several instances to craft recommendations and 
language for the report. When the two caucuses reconvened in official meetings, the facilitators 
attempted to reconcile positions into consensus recommendations but in many cases were 
unsuccessful. 
The Joint Stakeholders (nonutility stakeholders) – including Acadia Center, City of 
Lebanon (CoL), Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Northeast Energy Efficiency Partners 
(NEEP), Energy Freedom Coalition for America (EFCA), Department of Environmental 
Services (DES), New Hampshire Legal Assistance, The Jordan Institute, and Revolution Energy 
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– convened on several occasions in person and via conference call. The group made no effort to 
include utility stakeholders in these extracurricular meetings. Similarly, extracurricular meetings 
among the utility representatives made no effort to involve the perspectives of the nonutility 
stakeholders. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
 Separate utility and nonutility stakeholder caucusing set the stage for positional 
bargaining in the final months of the working group process. DER affiliates and utility 
stakeholders caucused separately and took opposing positions on final report recommendations. 
Parties opted to forgo the goal of consensus in favor of making recommendations more suited to 
their coalition’s interests. The intent of the informal meetings hosted by DER affiliates was to 
craft recommendations that would allow them to better achieve their goals. The DER coalition 
did not make substantive efforts to reach out to the utility stakeholders during these meetings to 
seek consensus recommendations.  
 
Analysis – Process Design 
 External caucusing that separately convened DER and utility stakeholders served to 
further the already well-established division between these two stakeholder groups. The 
traditional regulatory paradigm inherently sets utility and DER stakeholders at odds with one 
another in a zero-sum game where, without creatively redesigning regulatory approaches, one’s 
gain necessitates another’s loss. Without changes to the status quo utility business model, DERs 
serve to erode utility revenue. This inherent conflict was exacerbated by the separate stakeholder 
caucusing, which defined the final months of the grid modernization process. Rather than 
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seeking to learn from one another and strive towards mutual gain solutions, the two camps only 
became further entrenched in their existing adversarial positioning. 
Table 3.9 – Separate Utility and Nonutility Caucusing Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Not collaborative; led major stakeholder groups (utilities and DER affiliates) to 
become entrenched in oppositional positions 
Process Design Not collaborative; positioned major stakeholder groups (utilities and DER 
affiliates) as adversaries, not as joint problem solvers 
  
 
Grid Modernization Process Outcomes 
As of this writing there are no policy outcomes associated with the grid modernization 
investigation. For this reason, analyzing process outcomes is problematic. The only outcome is 
the final working group report to the Commission. In this section I review the content of the final 
Grid Modernization Report and analyze the report according to whether or not it produced 
predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative processes, according to Table 3.10. Table 3.10 
comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s 
convenience. 
Table 3.10 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 Collaborative Adjudicative 
Process 
Outcomes 
Produces mutual gain solutions Produces winner-take-all outcomes 
Promotes positive relationships Damages relationships 
Collaboration institutionalized Maintains silos of actors 
 
The final report contains consensus language from all parties, consensus 
recommendations from all parties, and separate recommendations of utility and nonutility 
stakeholders. In this way, the interests of all parties were represented in the final report, either as 
consensus language or as divergent recommendations. The process promoted understanding, as 
all parties had the opportunity to learn about the various components of grid modernization 
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collectively. 
I have insufficient data to determine whether most stakeholders perceived their 
relationships to be affected by the grid modernization docket, but, from personal experience as 
an active member of the working group, the grid modernization docket improved my own 
relationships with both DER and utility stakeholders.  
It is too early to say whether or not grid modernization will produce further 
institutionalization of collaborative procedures, as the Commission has not yet indicated any next 
steps for grid modernization. However, the net metering ruling, discussed in the next chapter, 
includes next steps associated with data collection and rate design, two of the central issues of 
grid modernization. It is plausible that the final Grid Modernization report helped inform the 
Commissioners as they made their ruling in the net metering docket, which, as will be shown in 
the coming chapter, most certainly did create further forums for continued collaboration around 
grid modernization. In this sense, the grid modernization docket may have contributed to the 
development of new formal collaborative procedures. 
 
Table 3.11 – Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary 
Process Outcomes Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; all interests represented in 
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Discussion 
Table 3.12 – Summary of Characteristics of Grid Modernization Docket Stages 





Collaborative; collected information from 
interested stakeholders to inform scope and 
process; Commission shared information 
among stakeholders to be used as common 
resource 
Mixed; Commission invited input 
regarding process agenda, but no 






Collaborative; intent of process was to 
achieve consensus; experts enlisted to 
facilitate interest sharing; parties 
brainstormed, engaged in dialogue, shared 
interests; parties reverted to positional 
bargaining only when interests could not be 
reconciled 
Collaborative; stakeholders 
collectively made agenda decisions 




Collaborative; intent to share interests and 
learn with goal of consensus; when interests 
could not be reconciled stakeholders reverted 
to positional bargaining 
Collaborative; process decisions made 
collectively by group; group 
membership self-selected and 





Not collaborative; led major stakeholder 
groups (utilities and DER affiliates) to 
become entrenched in oppositional positions 
Not collaborative; positioned major 
stakeholder groups (utilities and DER 
affiliates) as adversaries, not as joint 
problem solvers 
   
 
One stakeholder representing a DER-affiliated organization described the overall grid 
modernization docket as, “Useful… an opportunity to share information and to learn 
collectively… We can have stakeholder discussions to create shared knowledge and 
understanding of the positions and that is valuable...” (NH Interview 13, 2016). The working 
group was a rare opportunity to convene utility and DER stakeholders for an extensive crash 
course in the regulatory, technical, and financial complexities of the electricity system. This 
learning occurred primarily through interested-based sharing and dialogue occurring during 
formal meetings and facilitated by expert consultants. 
Yet despite the enlistment of expert facilitators to manage a collaborative process, the 
Grid Modernization Working Group was unsuccessful in producing a broad consensus on what 
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grid modernization means for New Hampshire. The final Grid Modernization Report contains 14 
separate instances of contradictory recommendations labeled “utility” and “nonutility” (Grid 
Modernization Working Group, 2017). What was lacking in the grid modernization docket was a 
commitment by utility and DER stakeholders to work jointly beyond formal PUC meetings. 
Working group members diligently attended meetings, completed homework assignments, and in 
a few discrete instances (and at the direction of the facilitators) convened diverse task forces in 
an effort to hash out consensus on particular issues. But neither of the two coalitions made a 
serious effort to engage and collaborate with the other beyond formal working group meetings. 
Instead, utilities and DER affiliates opted to caucus separately with members of their respective 
tribes. Even during working group meeting lunch breaks the two tribes unfailingly self-
segregated, forgoing opportunities to build relationships and understanding across the divide. 
The importance of extracurricular meetings and informal gatherings cannot be overlooked, yet 
these grid modernization meetings served to reinforce existing divisions. 
According to Meredith Hatfield, the former director of OEP and the driving force behind 
the success of the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) process, leadership is “about 
finding common ground and collaborating to create solutions that work for everyone—and 
seeing how often you can achieve better outcomes by incorporating diverse views” (Hatfield, 
2016). Hatfield’s leadership in pulling together utility and DER perspectives outside of formal 
PUC procedure was essential in realizing the EERS consensus agreement. Unfortunately for the 
Grid Modernization Working Group, no similar such leadership emerged to take advantage of 
the opportunity to further bridge the division between utilities and DER affiliates. 
External meetings serve an essential function in PUC processes because they can free 
stakeholders from the formal and suppressive litigious atmosphere of official meetings, meetings 
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that literally take place in a hearing room. External meetings are an opportunity for stakeholders 
to engage on their own terms and in alternative settings, which can be more conducive to candid 
exchanges and relationship building. But this opportunity is squandered when external meetings 
reinforce tribal divisions between utility and DER participants, as was the case for much of grid 
modernization. 
Two factors contributed to the lack of stakeholder commitment and capacity to 
collaboration in the grid modernization case. First, each coalition’s best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (BATNA) was acceptable. Because the docket was an investigation with 
no immediate policy actions, the stakes were lower than in the EERS and net metering cases, and 
thus there was less risk associated with a non-consensus outcome. Second, the grid 
modernization investigation occurred at the same time as the net metering adjudication, which, 
as will be discussed in the coming chapter, required high levels of time and resources from all 
parties. The high stakes of net metering demanded that stakeholders allocate their resources to 
that docket, which lessened stakeholder capacity to pursue consensus in the grid modernization 
case. 
The grid modernization investigation showed that the PUC process is just one component 
of successful collaboration. In chapter two we learned how stakeholders can work together to 
shape both the formal PUC process and informal extracurricular meetings towards collaboration. 
In the EERS docket, when official PUC meetings proved insufficient to allow stakeholders to 
reach a consensus agreement, the parties convened on their own terms outside of the PUC. 
Stakeholder commitment to reaching an agreement that worked for all parties proved equally, if 
not more important, than the procedures employed by the Commission. The burden of achieving 
consensus and fostering collaboration is only in part the responsibility of the PUC and the 
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facilitator, whether that facilitator is a PUC Staff Attorney or a professional consultant. Much of 
the responsibility lies with the stakeholders, the utilities, DER affiliates, and other parties 
engaging in the policy process. 






CHAPTER IV: NET METERING 
 
In this chapter I first provide an overview of net metering. I then provide an overview of 
the PUC docket process for revising the net metering policy. Next, I describe each stage of the 
docket process in greater detail and analyze each for opportunities and barriers to collaboration. I 
then describe in greater detail the content of the Net Metering policy decision and analyze it 
according to stakeholder outcomes. I close the chapter with a discussion. 
 
What is Net Metering? 
 Net Metering is the reason there is a solar industry in the United States. It is a policy that 
allows distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar) to sell excess electricity not consumed at the 
site of production into the electric grid. This excess generation turns the electricity meter 
backwards as it flows out to the grid to be consumed by a neighboring point of demand. At the 
end of the billing cycle, the meter is billed for the net amount of energy that passes from the grid 
to the customer. If the distributed generation system exports an equal amount of energy onto the 
grid as is imported from the grid, the volumetric portion of the customer’s bill will equal zero. 
The customer will still pay the fixed monthly customer charge (e.g., $12.89 for residential 
Eversource customers in New Hampshire) (see Fig. 4.1). When exported electricity to the grid 
exceeds imported electricity from the grid (e.g., in summer months) the customer is credited for 
the difference and can then tap into that credit in later months when imports exceed exports (e.g., 
winter months). A well-sized solar array will offset the customer’s annual electricity load, 
leaving them only with fixed monthly charges, virtually zeroing out their bill. 





 Net metering is a hotly contested issue in states across the country. Net metering 
proponents argue that solar power and other forms of distributed generation (DG) provide 
economic, social, and environmental benefits, as well as benefits to the electrical grid, and 
should be compensated accordingly. Utilities argue that by allowing customers to zero out their 
bills, the policy affords net metering customers free access to the electrical grid and shifts costs 
for maintaining the grid onto ratepayers who cannot or will not invest in distributed generation. 
Net metering, like energy efficiency, reduces utility revenue.9 
 
Net Metering Docket Process Overview 
In this section I provide an overview of the PUC docket process for revising New 
Hampshire’s net metering rate, or the rate of compensation for rooftop solar and other DG. I then 
analyze each stage of the process – including prehearing conference; testimony, discovery, and 
rebuttal; settlement; prehearing technical session and hearing – and identify opportunities and 
barriers for collaboration within each stage of the process. 
The Net Metering docket occurred at the direction of the bipartisan HB1116, “An Act 
Relative to Net Metering,” which directed the PUC to open a docket and to establish a new net 
metering rate within ten months. This ten-month timeline proved untenable, and the Commission 
amended the procedural schedule several times and extended the deadline by three months to 
allow the participants adequate time to complete the process. 
The PUC issued an order of notice and opened the docket on May 19, 2016. Dozens of 
stakeholders from across the state and several from across the country filed motions to intervene 
(formally participate in the docket). In initial technical sessions, the parties agreed it would be 
                                                 
9 For an informative debate over net metering in New Hampshire, see The Exchange (2017). 





useful to conduct a preliminary round of discovery on the utilities to collect data to be used in 
official testimony. After initial discovery, twelve of the 30 intervening parties filed testimony. 
The parties then conducted a round of discovery on one another’s proposals. Eleven parties, 
including the Commission Staff (who did not file initial testimony), then filed rebuttal testimony. 
Staff’s rebuttal testimony summarized the positions of the parties and provided commentary and 
recommendations based upon the record of evidence up to that point. Parties conducted a round 
of discovery on rebuttal testimony. 
The Commission then convened a series of settlement conferences. The Energy Future 
Coalition (EFC) – initially comprised of The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC), Conservation 
Law Foundation (CLF), Energy Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA), New Hampshire 
Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and ReVision Energy – filed an initial confidential 
settlement proposal. The Utility Consumer Coalition (UCC) – initially comprised of Eversource, 
Liberty, and Unitil – offered a counterproposal. The two coalitions negotiated back and forth and 
reached agreement on some issues but not others. Both coalitions expanded to include more 
stakeholders (see Fig 4.1). The Commission cancelled the first week of hearings to allow the 
parties further time to explore settlement and narrow the scope of issues. The two coalitions filed 
distinct but similarly structured settlement agreements. The Commission granted a “motion in 
limine to focus issues at hearing,” which limited issues to an agreed upon list of 16 in order to 
manage the scope of the hearing. All major parties formally supported limiting the scope of 
issues to be addressed at hearings (Birchard, M., 2017; Below, C., 2017; Sheehan, M., 2017). 
The Commission held three full days of hearings in late March 2017, one devoted to the 
EFC proposal, one devoted to the UCC proposal, and one to hear from Commission Staff and the 
City of Lebanon (CoL), neither of which signed on to a settlement agreement. On June 23, 2017, 





the Commission issued an order establishing a new net metering rate to be effective as of 
September 1, 2017. The order also set in motion a number of work groups to address pilot 
projects, data collection issues, and a value of distributed energy resources (DER) study. Figure 
4.2 depicts a detail map of the PUC net metering docket process. 
Fig. 4.1 – Dueling Settlement Agreements: A First for the Commission 
By the final hearing of the net metering docket, parties had narrowed down their positions from an 
original twelve separate policy proposals to two dueling settlement agreements supported by the 
following coalitions: 
 
The Energy Future Coalition (EFC): Acadia Center, The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC), 
Borrego Solar Systems, Inc., Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Energy Freedom 
Coalition of America, LLC (EFCA), New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association 
(NHSEA), ReVision Energy, Granite State Hydropower Association, Sunraise Investments 
LLC, Solar Endeavors LLC, and Revolution Energy, LLC. 
 
The Utility Consumer Coalition (UCC): Eversource, Liberty, Unitil, the Office of the 
Consumer Advocate (OCA), New England Ratepayers Association (NERA), Consumer 
Energy Alliance (CEA), the Office of Energy and Planning (OEP), and Standard Power of 
America, Inc. 
 
The City of Lebanon (CoL) was the only party that filed initial testimony but did not sign with 
either of these two coalitions. Commission Staff did not sign with either of the two settlement 
agreements. 
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I now analyze each of the stages of the net metering docket process for opportunities and 
barriers to collaboration in accordance with Table 4.1. Table 4.1 comes directly from Table 1.5, 
p. 38 of my research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience. 
Table 4.1 – Characteristics of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 
Stage #1: Prehearing Conference and Opening Technical Session (June 10, 2016) 
 Table 4.2 lists organizations and individuals appearing at the prehearing conference for 
the net metering docket. 
Table 4.2 – Appearances at Net Metering Prehearing Conference 
Unitil City of Lebanon (CoL) 
Liberty Utilities Barrington Power 
Eversource Norwitch Technologies 
Borrego Solar Systems Standard Power of America 
Granite State Hydro Association New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA) 
Office of Energy and Planning (OEP) Energy Emporium 
The Jordan Institute Revolution Energy 
ReVision Energy The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC) 
City of Nashua Representative Lee Oxenham 
Freedom Energy Logistics Pentti Aalto 
Acadia Center Business and Industry Association (BIA) 
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) PUC Staff (Legal, Electric, Sustainable Energy) 
Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP) Presiding Commissioners 
 
The utilities, OCA, and Staff were invited to give preliminary statements of their 
positions regarding net metering. Following the prehearing conference, intervening parties met in 
a technical session to establish a procedural schedule. 




Characterized by integrative interest-
based negotiation 
Characterized by positional and rights-
based bargaining 
Information used as a 
common resource 
Information used to further 
each side’s position 
Process 
Design 
Process tailored by stakeholders Process prescribed, same for all cases 
Procedures position parties as joint 
problem solvers 
Procedures position parties 
as adversaries 





Analysis – Process Design 
 Chairman Honigberg made clear during the prehearing conference that while both the 
statute directing PUC action on net metering and the order of notice put forth by the Commission 
set out many of the issues that would be addressed by the docket, “the schedule is completely 
open at this point, and you will be developing the schedule” in the forthcoming technical session 
(NHPUC, 2016d, p. 6). In this docket, the legislature and the Commission made agenda 
decisions, but the collective stakeholders were presented with opportunities to mold process 
decisions in initial technical sessions. In this way, the prehearing conference and following 
technical session were characteristic of a collaborative process. 
Table 4.3 – Prehearing Conference and Initial Technical Session Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Not Applicable 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders provided with opportunity to make process 
decisions from the outset 
  
 
Stage #2: Technical Sessions 
 During early technical sessions parties collectively agreed upon a procedural schedule. 
The schedule outlined a series of deadlines beginning with an opportunity for parties to conduct 
a round of discovery on the utilities. Several parties suggested the process begin with discovery 
and not testimony so that information gleaned from discovery could inform testimony. 
Subsequent technical sessions were for the purpose of discussing issues related to discovery, 
testimony, and rebuttal. Unlike the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) docket, net 
metering technical sessions were not used to hear presentations from experts, or to deliberate 
policy options with the intent of moving the group towards consensus. Instead, technical sessions 
were organized around the more adversarial stages of PUC process. 





Analysis – Process Design 
 Early technical sessions allowed stakeholders to make process recommendations and 
collectively agree upon a procedural schedule. The agreed upon procedural schedule consisted of 
a series of deadlines for discovery requests, discovery responses, testimony, and rebuttal.  
Table 4.4 – Technical Sessions Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Not Applicable 




Stage #3: Testimony Filings, Discovery, and Rebuttal – Building a Cache of Ammunition (June 
2016 – January 2017) 
All parties vomit onto the table their positions… It’s overwhelming.  
- NH Utility Manager (NH Interview 15, 2017) 
 
The first eight months of the docket were dedicated to discovery, testimony filing, and 
rebuttal filings. Twelve parties filed initial testimony by the October 24 deadline. These filings 
were comprised of 32 documents and over 1,000 pages. Filings included written testimony, 
spreadsheets, cost benefit analyses, and various studies assessing the value of solar and other DG 
to the electric grid, each with widely varying conclusions. Many parties filing testimony did so in 
partnership with their individual expert consultants. Almost all filings were accompanied by 
resumes and CVs building the credibility of the party filing and highlighting long and 
distinguished careers in the energy sector. Commission Staff did not file initial testimony or 
policy proposals. Table 4.5 breaks down the volume of initial testimony. 
Testimony submitted as part of PUC proceedings is held to a high standard of credibility. 
For example, the Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA) withdrew its testimony from the record due 
to a deposition request filed by EFCA and assented to by CLF and TASC (Brown, 2017). The 





deposition request accused CEA of having “jeopardized the orderly and systematic presentation 
of evidence and argument” in the case “by providing apparently unsupported and inadmissible 
information” (Buxton, 2017).  
Table 4.5: Initial Testimony Filing Breakdown 
Party Documents Filed Pages Filed 
CEA 2 68 
CLF 2 93 
CoL 2 43 
EFCA 2 69 
Eversource 4 50 
Liberty 2 29 
NERA 1 30 
NHSEA 6 292 
OCA 2 76 
OEP 1 4 
TASC 2 95 
Unitil 6 173 
Total 32 1,022 
 
Two weeks after initial testimony filings, a flood of emails inundated the Net Metering 
service list with 80 new documents and over 1,000 discovery requests. One public servant 
responded to the surge of discovery by stating the following in an email to the service list: 
I am concerned that the massive amount of discovery requests now in circulation and the ten-day 
timeline present an untenable situation… We confront over 300 questions...  Many of the 
questions are unhelpfully argumentative; in my judgment, attention at this phase of the docket is 
best devoted to finding common ground rather than engaging in combat disguised as discovery 
(FN., 2017). 
 
Another stakeholder representing a DER affiliate shared a similar perspective, stating, “nobody 
can process all of the data generated from discovery and filings. It is overwhelming” (NH 
Interview 16, 2017). 
All parties are obligated to answer discovery questions to the best of their ability. And so, 
two weeks after all interrogatories were submitted, the responses came gushing through the 
service list in an even more impressive aftershock of 218 documents. Initial filings, discovery 





requests, and responses totaled over 300 documents and thousands if not tens of thousands of 
pages by mid-November. 
After discovery on initial filings, eleven parties filed rebuttal testimony. Rebuttal 
testimony is an opportunity for parties to defend against attacks made on their filings and to 
rebuke positions of opponents (NH Interview 14, 2016). Parties may not introduce any new 
issues into the record during rebuttal. They may only respond to issues that have already come 
up in the previous round of testimony. Table 4.6 breaks down the volume of rebuttal testimony. 
Table 4.6: Rebuttal Testimony Filing Breakdown 
Party Documents Pages 
Acadia 2 36 
CLF 1 48 
CoL 2 32 
EFCA 2 37 
Eversource 2 34 
NERA 3 186 
NHSEA 5 115 
OCA 1 8 
Staff 2 165 
TASC 2 66 
Unitil 4 146 
Total 26 873 
 
The discovery process was repeated after the filing of rebuttal testimony. Parties 
subjected one another’s rebuttal testimonies to a similarly overwhelming glut of discovery 
requests and responses as described for initial testimony. All told, initial and rebuttal testimonies 
and discovery requests and responses to those testimonies generated many thousands of pages of 
content. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
The net metering docket started out embodying many of the characteristics of a typical 
adversarial adjudication, particularly during testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal 





components. Early in the process parties took positions by filing testimony and policy proposals 
in preparation for a rights-based contest in which they would strive to win a favorable decision 
from the Commission. 
Multiple parties described the discovery and rebuttal processes as opportunities to attack 
and undermine the positions of others (NH Interview 9, 2016; NH Interview 14, 2016). A less 
common but perhaps more appropriate label for discovery is interrogatory. The purpose of 
discovery is to afford the parties equal opportunity to interrogate one another’s proposals, to 
subject them to rigorous scrutiny. Participants use the discovery and rebuttal processes to 
highlight weaknesses in the positions of others and to create a written record of those weaknesses 
that may then be used as ammunition to discredit their opponents in the coming hearing. In the 
case of net metering, the discovery component of the process was about stockpiling ammunition 
that would help individual parties achieve favorable rulings over each other in preparation for the 
litigated hearing.  
 
Analysis – Process Design 
The testimony, discovery, and rebuttal components of the process are typical of PUC 
adjudication. Stakeholders extract information from one another in a one-directional fashion, 
rather than a free-flowing dialogue with an exchange of ideas. In this way, parties are positioned 
as adversaries, not as joint problem solvers. 
There is value in the adversarial nature of testimony, discovery, and rebuttal components 
of the process. These components afford all parties equal opportunity to be heard, and all 
stakeholders did collectively agree to a procedural schedule based around discovery, testimony, 
and rebuttal. These phases of the process also allow for transparency and lend legitimacy to the 





positions of the parties. Parties have the opportunity to formally draw attention to questionable 
testimony, as was the case with the requested deposition of CEA by EFCA and others, which 
resulted in CEA withdrawing the testimony in question. 
But this phase of the process is resource intensive, requiring large expenditures of money 
and time on expert consultants, on drafting testimony, discovery, and rebuttal, and on responding 
to discovery. One utility manager had the following to say in the immediate aftermath of the 
discovery/testimony/rebuttal storm: 
My participation in [the net metering docket] is nothing short of a burden… And I look at the 
Staff and they are in so many different dockets and then the legislature gives us a 10-month 
window and they have a mountain of paper work… I can commiserate with them. This is brutal. 
When we go to hearing, what am I going to do? Say [to our attorney], ‘ok [sic], develop cross-
examination for 12 different parties who submitted hundreds of pages of testimony each’?! (NH 
Interview 15, 2017). 
 
At roughly the same point in time a member of the DER affiliates described the process 
as, “personally nerve-wracking”, an “enormous power struggle” akin to a “high stakes poker 
game” (NH Interview 17, 2017). Many parties, ranging from state agencies to utilities to DER 
affiliates, expressed similar dismay at the burdensome quality of this portion of the process, 
especially in the case of twelve separate sets of testimony and the amount of discovery that 
comes with them (NH Interview 12, 2016; NH Interview 14, 2016; NH Interview 15, 2017; NH 
Interview 16, 2017). 
Table 4.7 – Discovery, Testimony, and Rebuttal Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Not collaborative; characterized by ammunition stockpiling in preparation for 
adversarial, rights-based contest; information used to support own position and to 
attack and undermine positions of others 
Process Design Mixed; as result of early stakeholder dialogue, parties agreed to schedule of 











Stage #4: Joint Utility and Nonutility External Meetings 
 Throughout much of the process utility and DER affiliate organizations met informally 
outside of PUC meetings to negotiate a potential agreement. These external negotiations failed to 
achieve any level of agreement between these two major coalitions. I do not have sufficient data 
to adequately analyze these meetings. 
 
Stage #5: Settlement – Where the Magic Happens (Late January – March 2017) 
 Commission Staff began convening settlement conferences in late January 2017, eight 
months after the start of the docket. At the start of settlement Staff reminded all parties: 
Pursuant to PUC 203.20(a), ‘all participants in settlement conferences shall treat discussions at 
settlement conferences as confidential and shall not disclose the contents of such discussions to 
third parties or seek to introduce them into evidence.’ As a result of these confidentiality 
restrictions, only parties and their authorized representatives may attend the settlement discussion 
portions of the technical sessions (FN., 2017). 
 
 Very little progress was made during the initial two meetings with “a lot of posturing on 
both sides” (NH Interview 21, 2017). The coalition of solar interest groups, led by Energy 
Freedom Coalition of America (EFCA), insisted that in order to quantify the value that solar 
provides to the electric grid, the utilities need to collect and make available a year’s worth of 
temporally and geographically granular data regarding their distribution systems. The utilities 
expressed skepticism that such an expensive and laborious undertaking would produce any 
worthwhile findings. Towards the end of the first day of settlement, Unitil addressed the solar 
coalition and made the position of the utilities explicit: “We are not hearing anything that makes 
us have any reason to believe we will do better in a settlement than in a hearing… We are not 
going to be able to agree to full retail net metering less the non-bypassable charges [SBC, ECT, 
SCRC]. You need to put more on the table” (FN., 2017) (see Fig. 4.3). 





At the third settlement conference, occurring on February 14 2017, the solar coalition 
arrived early and representatives from The Alliance for Solar Choice (TASC), EFCA, ReVision 
Energy, New Hampshire Sustainable Energy Association (NHSEA), and SolarCity positioned 
themselves in the front of the room facing everyone else (see Fig. 4.4). At Staff’s direction they 
opened the meeting with a coordinated overview of their settlement proposal, which they – along 
with Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) – had formally filed four days prior. The proposal 
stressed the importance of “collecting the necessary data” in order to send “improved price 
signals [that] more accurately reflect the locational and temporal value and costs of [DERs]” 
(Culley, et al., 2017). The proposal included a series of pilot projects to test out new rate designs 
as a bridging step, which would eventually inform a more data-driven approach, referred to as 
“Phase II” (Culley, et al., 2017). 
 OCA praised the proposal and suggested it could be improved by including provisions 
expanding DER access to low- and moderate-income communities. CoL noted the proposal 
failed to address utility lost revenue concerns, but indicated he might support the proposal if it 
were expanded to include his proposed real-time pricing and municipal aggregation pilot. Liberty 
expressed concern that the Liberty’s billing and metering systems are not capable of 
accommodating such a proposal. Eversource expressed a desire for more clarity about how and 
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Fig 4.3 – A Typical NH Monthly Electricity Bill 
 
Customer Charge …………….………………… (fixed) ………..…………….  $12.89 
 
Generation Supply Charge (energy service) … 600kWh * $0.110 ……………… $66.00 
Distribution Charge …………………………  600kWh * $0.042 ……………… $25.20 
Transmission Charge ……….…….………..... 600kWh * $0.024 ……………… $14.40 
Stranded Cost Recovery Charge ….………… 600kWh * $0.001 ……………… $00.60 
System Benefits Charge ………….…………  600kWh * $0.003 ……………… $01.98 
Electricity Consumption Tax ……………….. 600kWh * $0.00055 …………… $00.33 
Total = $121.40 
 
Under net metering, customer-generators who produced 600kWh during the month pay 
only the fixed customer charge. 
Non-bypassable charges: Stranded Cost Recovery Charge (SRCR), System Benefits 
Charge (SBC), and Electricity Consumption Tax (ECT). 





In the third-to-last settlement meeting the utility coalition presented its counterproposal to 
the solar coalition’s proposal. This meeting was scheduled last minute by Staff in a last ditch 
attempt to achieve a consensus agreement before the hearing. One stakeholder said the meeting 
“saw a lot of movement” on both the utility and solar side of the issue (FN., 2017). 
Staff opened the penultimate settlement conference by stating the following: “Today is a 
critical day – time is running out. I expect it will be helpful to, throughout the day, take breaks, 
have breakout groups and caucuses – perhaps staff can circulate and facilitate these frank 
discussions as we go” (FN., 2017). 
The solar coalition circulated a rushed counter-counterproposal and SolarCity’s 
representative took the floor stating the following: “We sincerely appreciate the efforts of the 
utilities in this counterproposal. We feel that we are not too far off [from an agreement]. 
However, here are our concerns…” (FN., 2017). He went on to list the lack of a clear direction 
towards time-based rate design, the absence of the four pilot programs the solar coalition, OCA, 
and CoL have been fighting for, and, perhaps most importantly, the lack of any compensation for 
distribution charges (see Fig. 4.3). As a compromise, he suggested instead a “gradualist 
approach” in which the distribution rate be reduced by 10% each year until sufficient data allows 
for more accurate pricing of distributed energy resources (DERs). 
During the first half of the day conversations were fast-paced, parties alert and energetic. 
There was an air of excitement in the room and for the first time some dared to hope a settlement 
agreement might be possible. At 10:30 we broke for caucusing and the utility coalition and the 
solar coalition retreated to separate quarters. 
Parties reconvened after about an hour and Liberty took the floor on behalf of the utilities 
to announce the utilities had made a number of “concessions” (FN., 2017). They conceded to 





extend grandfathering from 15 to 20 years. They conceded on the establishment of task forces to 
address various pilot projects. They conceded on a data collection task force. They conceded and 
agreed to support a value of DER study. But on the issue of the distribution charge, they held 
their ground. The utilities maintained net metering customers should receive no compensation 
for the distribution charge portion of the retail electric rate (see Fig. 4.3). 
At the end of the day, Staff closed the meeting as follows: 
Everyone should take some time tonight and tomorrow morning to review with their coalitions 
and be ready to come back at 10:00am tomorrow. I don’t think we are ready to give up on this 
settlement yet. So tomorrow, we will give it one more shot and if we decide we need to go to 
hearing we can discuss the logistics of that as well (FN., 2017). 
 
One member of the solar coalition who works mostly outside of New Hampshire 
reflected on the final day’s settlement conference in the following way: 
[Someone] actually bought like 15 pizzas on the last day of settlement for everyone. We had 
made what was basically our final proposal and Staff was playing shuttle diplomacy between our 
room and the utility room and everyone was sitting around eating pizza while we were waiting 
around until the end of the day. And then the clock ran out and nobody blinked. But we all stuck 
it out until the end… I have been active in similar cases in Maine and I will say that people in 
New Hampshire are way more engaged, way more involved. I really enjoy working here quite a 
bit. New Hampshire people have just been so great (NH Interview 22, 2017). 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
 During settlement conferences, conflict management frames were largely interest based. 
Stakeholders asked questions, made suggestions, responded respectfully and politely to the 
concerns of other stakeholders, and worked to understand one another’s needs in an effort to 
reach a consensus agreement. Stakeholders used information gained about each other to clarify 
and to work to find creative solutions that would meet all parties’ interests. No effort was made 
to use information to undermine positions of others. The explicit decision-making goal was 
consensus. 





 The free-flowing exchange of settlement allowed parties to better understand the 
complexity of the issues and allowed parties to learn about which issues were most important to 
each of them. In some cases, some issues were of higher importance to one party than another. 
For example, utilities were willing to concede on issues such as grandfathering, pilot projects, 
and the value of DER study, which were of higher importance to the solar coalition but did not 
have much importance to the utilities. However, other issues, such as whether solar and other DG 
should receive compensation for distribution charges, were addressed using positional 
bargaining. 
 
Analysis – Process Design 
 Stakeholders had the opportunity to collectively shape agenda decisions during 
settlement. The solar coalition filed the first settlement proposal and set the agenda of the 
following settlement conference by explaining their proposal to the other parties. Parties then 
provided constructive commentary on how the proposal might be improved to better include a 
greater range of interests. The utility coalition then had the opportunity pick up agenda design 
where the solar coalition left it by submitting their counterproposal. The group collectively 
designed and redesigned the agenda during settlement. 
 One intended purpose of settlement was to learn about the interests of others and learn 
whether those interests could be met through brainstorming, deliberation, and integrative 
negotiations. Settlement conferences are confidential; only once a settlement agreement has been 
formally filed with the Commission does it become fair content for the hearing. The 
confidentiality of the settlement conferences created space for creative brainstorming of a wide 





range of issues as it freed parties from the fear that their words or ideas would be used against 
them in the hearing and allowed parties to engage as joint problem solvers. 
Table 4.8 – Settlement Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Collaborative; characterized by sharing of interests, dialogue; confidentiality allowed 
information to be used for learning, not undermining and attacking 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders collectively made agenda and process decisions by 
sharing and revising settlement proposals; interactions characterized by free-flowing 
exchange of ideas and information 
  
 
Stage #6: Prehearing Technical Session, Hearing Design, and Hearing (March 2017) 
After the close of official settlement negotiations, Staff canceled the first week of 
hearings to “provide parties a greater opportunity to develop and file settlement proposals and to 
prepare for hearing” (FN., 2017). Staff reasoned, “in view of the likelihood that one or more 
settlement agreements will be filed in this docket… the scope of the hearings therefore should be 
more focused and limited” (FN., 2017). In other words, parties should “set guard rails” for the 
hearing by leaving their initial positions from initial testimony at the door and limiting the issues 
at hearing to differences between the two settlement proposals (FN., 2017). 
The City of Lebanon (CoL) applauded the decision to cancel the first week of hearings in 
the following email to the net metering service list: 
To the extent that very substantive issues are at stake in settlement agreements, this modest 
amount of additional time may well give the parties a very meaningful opportunity to better think 
through and flesh out their settlement proposals and perhaps find more common ground and thus 
further narrow the issues to be addressed at hearing. Thank you! (FN., 2017). 
 
 The following week, the Energy Future Coalition (EFC) and the Utility Consumer 
Coalition (UCC) filed “dueling” settlement agreements (see Fig. 4.1), a first for the Commission. 
Staff then convened a prehearing technical session in which stakeholders collectively agreed 
upon the format and scope that the hearings would take. A Unitil representative offered up a road 
map for the hearing and other stakeholders agreed to these provisions: 





1. All prefiled and rebuttal testimony are submitted into the record as evidence; 
2. Each of the two coalitions calls a panel of witnesses to defend their settlement 
agreements; panels subject to cross-examination; 
3. Each of the two coalitions calls a panel of witnesses to critique the other settlement 
agreement; panels subject to cross examination; 
4. Each coalition may submit other exhibits into evidence. 
Staff, OCA, and CLF drafted a “motion to focus issues at hearing” which both coalitions 
formally endorsed (Birchard, 2017). The Commission held three days of hearings in late March. 
One day was dedicated to the EFC settlement proposal, one day was dedicated to the UCC 
settlement proposal, and one day was dedicated to the CoL and Commission Staff testimony. The 
Commission deliberated in isolation for the next two months and issued its final order in late 
June. 
 
Analysis – Basis for Dispute Resolution 
Preparation for the hearing was characterized by interest-based issue framing. Parties 
communicated their shared interest in creating a manageable hearing process, listened to the 
suggestions of one another, and collectively agreed upon a hearing format.  
Hearings are all about undermining the positions of your opponents and supporting your 
own positions so they may prevail in the final ruling. Contested hearings have no room for 
interest sharing. Stakeholders cross-examine each other in an effort to extract information that 
will discredit their positions. The explicit goal of the hearing is to emerge victorious over your 
opponents. Hearings are textbook adversarial rights-based contests. 
 





Analysis – Process Design 
Staff extended the deadline once more by cancelling the first week of hearings (Wiesner, 
2017). In the end, only three days of hearings were necessary and by cancelling the first week, 
the parties were afforded still further time to narrow issues and file settlements. Once settlements 
were filed, the parties collaborated again to design the format and content of the hearing 
(Howland, 2017). A majority of parties formally endorsed the motion to focus issues at hearings, 
further simplifying and streamlining the process (Birchard, 2017; Below, 2017; Sheehan, 2017). 
The prehearing technical session provided parties opportunity to collaboratively design the 
agenda and prepare for the hearing. 
Table 4.9 – Prehearing Technical Session, Hearing Design, and Hearing Analysis Summary 
Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Not collaborative; adversarial, rights-based contest; cross-examination as tool to 
attack and undermine positions 
Process Design Collaborative; stakeholders collectively designed agenda and process of hearing 




Content of Net Metering 2.0 Policy – Remember Data and Rate Design? 
The new rates [for net metering in New Hampshire] are essentially a mashup of utility- and 
solar-backed proposals, and represent a more collaborative approach to developing new net 
metering rates. –Walton (2017) 
 
In this section I review the content of the net metering policy decision and analyze the 
decision according to whether or not it produced predicted stakeholder outcomes of collaborative 
processes, according to Table 4.10. Table 4.10 comes directly from Table 1.5, p. 38 of my 
research design and is repeated here for the reader’s convenience. 
 
 





Table 4.10 – Stakeholder Outcomes of Collaborative and Adjudicative Processes 
 Collaborative Adjudicative 
Process 
Outcomes 
Produces mutual gain solutions Produces winner-take-all outcomes 
Promotes positive relationships Damages relationships 
Collaboration institutionalized Maintains silos of actors 
 
A New Net Metering Rate 
The final order from the Commission made the following decision regarding the new net 
metering rate: 
Customer generators will receive monthly excess export credits equal to the value of kWh 
charges for energy service and transmission service at 100 percent and distribution service at 25 
percent, while paying non-bypassable charges, such as the system benefits charge, stranded cost 
recovery charge, other similar surcharges, and the state electricity consumption tax, on the full 
amount of their imports from the grid (NHPUC, 2017a).  
 
The most significant change, in terms of economic impact, is the reduction in the 
distribution credit received by net metering customers from 100% to 25% (see Fig 4.1). This was 
one of the issues that divided the solar and utility coalitions. The Commission made the ruling to 
reduce the distribution rate even when finding that neither coalition provided a “significant 
record of evidence supporting the amount of the reduction proposed or the actual net benefits of 
[distributed generation] energy exports to the utility distribution system” (NHPUC, 2017a). 
Some stakeholders suggested that this reduction, despite the lack of evidence justifying it, was in 
part due to the influence of legislative expectation that the rate should be reduced, a political 
consideration that played a role in the decision making of the Commission (FN., 2016; FN., 
2017; NH Interview 17, 2017; NH Interview 20, 2017). The perceived danger was that if the 
Commission ruled to leave the rate unchanged, they risked legislative retaliation in the form of 
HB518, a bill that, if passed, would reduce the rate received by net metering customers to a level 
that would destroy the economic value proposition of solar (FN., 2017; NH Interview 20, 2017). 





In addition to setting a new net metering rate, the order also set in motion work groups 
that will take on two of the main issues investigated by the Grid Modernization Working Group: 
data collection and rate design. 
 
Data Collection and Value of Distributed Energy Resources Study 
Both Commission Staff and the solar coalition made the lack of sufficient utility data 
available to accurately quantify the costs imposed by DER or the value that DER provides to the 
electric grid an issue of central importance in the docket (Faryniarz, 2016; NHPUC, 2017b). 
Accordingly, the Commission ordered the collection of the necessary utility data to inform a 
value of DER study by an independent party. The Commission directed that the utilities: 
should collect and make available load shape data for individual distribution circuits, or at least 
for a selected sample of distribution circuits, as well as customer load data on an hourly or shorter 
interval basis for at least a representative sample of customers, provided that the privacy of any 
customer-specific information is adequately protected (NHPUC, 2017a). 
 
Furthermore: 
the utilities should propose data collection plans in the first instance, including detailed current 
cost estimates. Those plans would then be reviewed and discussed with interested stakeholders 
through a working group process... Following the completion of the working group process, final 
detailed plans for data collection and dissemination should be prepared and implemented. If 
necessary to resolve disputed issues that cannot be worked out by the stakeholders, the data 
collection and dissemination plans may be submitted to the Commission for review and 
determination (NHPUC, 2017a). 
 
The Commission delegated data collection responsibility to the utilities under the 
condition that the utilities collaborate with interested parties in the data collection planning. If 
the parties cannot agree upon data collection efforts, they can bring their disagreement before the 
Commission for further adjudication. 
 
 





Pilot Projects – Time-Variant Rates (TVR), Non-wires Alternatives, and Equity Considerations 
In addition to the new rate, the data collection efforts, and the value of DER study, the 
Commission ordered the utilities, in collaboration with other stakeholders, to implement a series 
of pilot projects to explore alternative methods of DER integration. One key argument of the 
solar coalition was that accurate valuation of the benefits of DER requires dynamic or time-
variant rate design (TVR), an issue of key importance to grid modernization. The data generated 
by the pilot projects “should be made available to a broad range of interested stakeholders, as 
well as Staff and Commission consultants” (NHPUC, 2017a). The pilot projects include: 
• A time-of-use (TOU) pilot that will be available to both customer generators (e.g., 
customers with solar) and nonsolar customers; 
• The City of Lebanon municipal aggregation through real-time pricing pilot (Below, 
2016); 
• A pilot that expands the benefits of distributed generation to low- and moderate-income 
communities; and 
• A “non-wires alternative” in which “the utilities should identify all distribution circuits or 
substations that are planned for upgrades within the next 5 years, the reason for the 
planned upgrades, the reliability criteria and benefits of the planned upgrades, and the 
estimated costs of the planned upgrades” (NHPUC, 2017a) 
The order reads on: 
With respect to the pilot program development process, we believe that the utilities should 
propose pilot program designs and related evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V) 
plans in the first instance, to be reviewed and discussed with interested stakeholders through a 










Analysis – Process Outcomes 
Table 4.11 illustrates utility and DER interests and positions as they relate to a subset of 
net metering issues, namely, which volumetric bill components should distributed generation 
(DG) receive compensation for (see Figure 4.3 for typical customer bill). 
Table 4.11 – Partial Net Metering Stakeholder Assessment Table 
 Issue Area (Volumetric Bill Components) Issue Area 
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 The learning that occurred through settlement negotiations revealed that the priority issue 
for utilities is the rate of compensation for distribution charges. Across the other three volumetric 
                                                 
10 Retail electricity rates are equal to the sum of per kWh charges for Generation, Transmission, 
Distribution, and Nonbypassable rates. See Figure 4.3, p. 117 for typical bill breakdown. 





components of energy rates (energy supply/generation, transmission, and nonbypassable 
charges) utility and DER stakeholder interests did not conflict. However, in regard to the 
distribution rate component, stakeholders were unable to imagine a creative solution that allowed 
them to resolve interests that appeared to be in direct conflict. 
The outcomes of the Net Metering docket met a diverse array of interests. The ruling on 
the new rate may have tipped in the favor of the Utility Consumer Coalition by reducing the 
distribution rate received by DG to 25% of retail, but the reduction to the rate is unlikely to 
significantly damage the solar industry. The ruling also directed that data collection and pilot 
project work groups be established, thus meeting interests of the Energy Future Coalition. 
The Commission ordered utility and DER affiliates to address two main issues from the 
grid modernization docket: data collection and rate design. In addressing next steps for data 
collection and rate design, the Commission directed the creation of further forums for 
collaboration between utility and DER stakeholders. In August 2017, utilities and DER 
stakeholders began reconvening to establish workgroups to address data collection issues, and 
value of DER study, and four pilot projects. These work groups represent a further 
institutionalization of collaborative opportunities for utility and DER stakeholders. 
Table 4.12 – Net Metering Stakeholder Outcomes Analysis Summary 
Process Outcomes Reflective of predicted results of collaborative process; produced mutual gain 










Table 4.13 - Summary of Characteristics of Net Metering Docket Stages 
Stage Basis for Dispute Resolution Process Design 
Prehearing Conference 
and Initial Technical 
Session 
Not applicable Collaborative; stakeholders provided 
with opportunity to make process 
decisions from the outset 
Technical Sessions Not applicable Collaborative; stakeholders collectively 
agreed upon procedural schedule 
Discovery, Testimony, 
and Rebuttal 
Not collaborative; characterized by 
ammunition stockpiling in 
preparation for adversarial, rights-
based contest; information used to 
support own position and to attack 
and undermine positions of others 
Mixed; as result of early stakeholder 
dialogue, parties agreed to schedule of 
discovery, testimony, and rebuttal; 
stakeholder interactions as one-
directional, not free-flowing exchange 
Joint Utility and 
Nonutility External 
Meetings 
Insufficient data Insufficient data 
Settlement 
Conferences 
Collaborative; characterized by 
sharing of interests, dialogue; 
confidentiality allowed information 
to be used for learning, not 
undermining and attacking 
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively 
made agenda and process decisions by 
sharing and revising settlement 
proposals; interactions characterized by 




Design, and Hearing 
Not collaborative; adversarial, 
rights-based contest; cross-
examination as tool to attack and 
undermine positions 
Collaborative; stakeholders collectively 
designed agenda and process of hearing 
together as joint problem solvers before 
engaging as adversaries in the actual 
hearing 
   
 
 
Testimony filing, discovery, and rebuttal, the components which dominated the docket 
for the first eight months, embodied characteristics of adversarial processes. The purpose of 
these components of the process was to stake out a position, to critique the positions of 
opponents, and to stockpile ammunition that could be used in the hearing to help win the case. 
Conversely, settlement conferences, the component of the process that is relegated to the last few 
weeks before the hearing, embodied characteristics of collaborative processes. In settlement, 
parties made creative proposals, learned about each other’s interests and priorities, and sought 
agreement on issues, rather than attacking each other’s positions. It was during settlement that 





nearly all of the substantive decision making that went into the Commission’s final ruling took 
place. 
Again, as was the case in the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) docket, from 
the outset stakeholders were provided with an opportunity to design their own procedural 
schedule. However, unlike the EERS in which stakeholders designed a process around collective 
learning, the net metering docket was designed around the litigious process of testimony, 
discovery, and rebuttal. The net metering docket showed how a collaborative process design 
without a collaborative basis for dispute resolution is insufficient to foster true collaboration. The 
basis for dispute resolution found in discovery, testimony, and rebuttal stages lacked any 
collaborative characteristics. It was only during settlement conferences, which embodied 
collaborative characteristics of both basis for dispute resolution and process design, that 
successful integrative negotiations occurred. Particularly, dialogue, information sharing, and 
learning were missing from discovery, testimony, and rebuttal. 
Testimony, discovery, and rebuttal did serve an important function: they allowed all 
parties an equal opportunity to make an evidence-based argument in favor of their desired 
outcomes. They also helped ensure only high-quality data and evidence were being considered in 
the decision making process. But they were also burdensome, time and resource intensive, and 
divisive. Conversely, settlement conferences allowed parties to leave behind their initial 
positions and creatively brainstorm solutions that would meet the needs of each. While parties 
did not reach a unanimous consensus, they did reach consensus on many of the issues at stake 
and were able to leave behind the extreme positions taken in testimony in favor of a more 
integrative agreement. 




CHAPTER V: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS, SUMMARY FINDINGS, 
DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
The Decentralization of Power 
The most important new sources of competitive advantage in today’s rapidly changing electricity 
sector are not technology or market position; they are the ability of innovators to work efficiently 
and effectively in complex multi-stakeholder environments. Shifting the electricity sector will 
require engagement and innovation across traditional institutional boundaries. 
–Rocky Mountain Institute (2017) 
 
One of the fundamental legal concepts in these United States is the idea that the 
adversarial process that you find in courts… is one of the best processes to get to the 
truth. There is this general underlying belief that the adversarial process is beneficial 
because it enables people to get to what the facts actually are. But it doesn’t always 
work… I think that there are some cases, probably Net Metering being one of them, 
EERS, Grid Mod, anywhere you are trying to set policy across a wide spectrum, I think 
you need to lean more towards a collaborative process. Having 30 parties present 30 
different ideas and attack each of those ideas, by the time we are done with all this stuff, 
assuming its fully adjudicated and we argue all this stuff out to the nth degree, is anybody 
going to feel any smarter? Is anyone going to feel like they got to the truth of what solar 
can provide to the system? What the system’s needs really are? 
–NH Utility Manager (NH Interview 15, 2017) 
 
The three dockets analyzed in this research depict a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) 
beginning to grapple with the challenges of 21st century energy system design. The standard 
PUC process, a process designed to set rates for monopoly corporations, has been deemed 
inappropriate for addressing this new challenge (VEIC, 2011; NHLBA, 2012; Hatfield, et al., 
2013; VEIC, 2013; NHOEP, 2014; LBNL, 2017). In contrast, the cases I have observed, which 
embody the new policy challenges of DER integration, provide examples of opportunities for 
collaboration, but also examples of continued barriers to collaboration. Table 5.1 presents a 





Table 5.1 – Cross Case Summary of Docket Characteristics 
 EERS Grid Modernization Net Metering 
Process Stage Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 
Process Design Basis for Dispute 
Resolution 






Not collaborative; EERS 
Straw Proposal process 
limited face-to-face 
interaction; process and 
agenda decisions made 
unilaterally by Electric 
Division 
Collaborative; 
collected info from 
stakeholders to 
inform scope and 
process; info used as 
common resource 
Mixed; PUC invited 
input regarding 
process/agenda, but 
no opportunity for 
face-to-face dialogue 
among stakeholders 




Collaborative; parties made 
process recommendations; 
recommendations created 
space for collective learning, 
deliberation 











Collaborative; info and 
technical expertise shared 
among stakeholders to 
build collective 
understanding; 
brainstorming and interest 
sharing 
Collaborative; parties agreed 
on process/agenda decisions; 
created space for free-
flowing exchange of ideas 





















bargaining; info used to 
further own position and 




process steps to delay 
testimony filing; one-
directional attacks on 
positions, as opposed to 
free-flowing exchange 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Not collaborative; 
ammunition 
stockpiling; info used 
to support own 
position and to attack 
and undermine 
positions of others 
Mixed; parties 







Mixed; intent – 
consensus, but insufficient 
to share interests, learn, 
and reach consensus 
Not collaborative; Electric 
Division made agenda 
decisions unilaterally 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Collaborative; 
interest sharing, 








Collaborative; goal = 
consensus; allowed for 
free-flowing exchange, 
learning 
Collaborative; process set 
collectively 
Mixed; collaborative 




when joint IOU & 
DER; adversarial 
when separate 
Insufficient data Insufficient data 
Hearing Collaborative (b/c 
consensus settlement); 
info used to clarify, not to 
attack/undermine 








       
Cross-Case Analysis, Summary Findings, Discussion, Conclusion 
 
 133
 In this section I organize my cross-case findings into three categories: (1) findings about 
the structure of the PUC process; (2) findings about the function of the PUC process stages; and 
(3) emergent findings. 
 
Findings about the Structure of the PUC Process 
 The structure of the PUC process is flexible. Better still, the broader energy policy-
making community has the power to contribute to the shaping of the PUC process. 
In the EERS case stakeholders constructively contributed to shaping PUC process in two 
important ways. First, at the prehearing conference they encouraged the Commissioners to begin 
the docket with educational and deliberative technical sessions, which the Commission obliged. 
The prehearing conference represents a rare opportunity for stakeholders to engage directly with 
the Commissioners and in this instance the opportunity was well capitalized on. Second, when 
stakeholders felt they were unable to find common ground in formal settlement conferences, they 
brought together DER and utility stakeholders in informal meetings to work out an agreement. In 
this case leadership, particularly OEP leadership, brought about collaboration. These two 
components of the process structure, educational technical sessions and joint DER and utility 
informal negotiations, were identified as critical components to achieving consensus in the EERS 
case. 
The grid modernization investigation provided a valuable contrast to the way the 
structure of informal stakeholder meetings can influence a process. In this case, informal 
meetings, which divided utility and DER stakeholders into opposing caucuses, were 
counterproductive to reconciling the interests of these two groups. Those who wish to cultivate a 
greater consensus among the sectors of New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community will 
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note the contrasting lessons of EERS and grid modernization informal meetings and seek to 
bring together utility and DER stakeholders beyond the walls of PUC proceedings. 
Paradoxically, the standard structure of the PUC process as applied to the net metering 
case appears to have contributed to bringing the stakeholders to the negotiation table with a 
strong desire to seek consensus. Each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA) was a fully contested litigation among dozens of parties and 13 sets of testimony, 
something all parties wished to avoid due to the risk and burden it would entail. By the time 
settlement negotiations were convened, many key parties were more than ready to seek common 
ground in order to avoid the risks of a courtroom showdown, in which a decision could go 
against their interests. In contrast, the grid modernization investigation, in which the stakes were 
lower due to lack of immediate policy actions resulting from the process, had no similar 
motivation to seek common ground in order to avoid a risky legal contest. In the grid 
modernization case, each coalition’s BATNA, a report containing non-consensus 
recommendations, was acceptable, far more so than their net metering BATNA of a risky 
multiparty litigation, which lessened the incentive to collaborate.  
In net metering, the standard PUC process convened settlement only after the long and 
resource-intensive period of adversarial ammunition stockpiling of testimony filing, discovery, 
and rebuttal, which limited opportunities for creative joint problem solving to the tail end of the 
process. Hosting confidential settlement negotiations earlier in the process has the potential to 
help parties avoid repeating the exhaustive ordeal of testimony, discovery, and rebuttal depicted 
in the net metering case. 
It is important for those stakeholders just beginning to engage in PUC proceedings and 
those long familiar with the institution to think critically about the way things are done and the 
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way things might be done differently to better meet the needs of the challenges at hand. The 
cases of EERS, grid modernization, and net metering make clear that the structure of the PUC 
process can be molded and shaped by those with the leadership and commitment necessary to 
tackle the energy challenges of our modern era. 
 
Findings about the Functions of the PUC Process Stages 
Different stages of PUC process serve different functions. If the Commission wishes to 
achieve the policy goal of creating a more collaborative approach to decision making it will 
expand the role of those stages that serve the functions associated with collaborative processes. I 
refer primarily to technical sessions (work groups), settlement conferences, and informal 
collaboration between utilities and DER affiliates. 
 EERS technical sessions served the function of creating space for collective learning, 
sharing of interests, and deliberation between utility and DER groups. These technical sessions 
also allowed stakeholders to incorporate perspectives from a wide range of expertise. 
Contributions from experts were used to create a shared basis of understanding, as opposed to 
expert contributions during testimony and discovery, which were used by some stakeholders to 
shore up their own positions and attack the positions of others. Additionally, informal meetings 
convening utility and nonutility stakeholders in the EERS case provided the parties with 
supplementary negotiation space when formal meetings proved insufficient. Informal meetings 
served the important function of creating space for creative exchanges and deliberation. 
Again in grid modernization, working group meetings served much the same function as 
EERS technical sessions. Stakeholders convened to learn about issues together, engage in 
dialogue and creative exchanges, and work jointly to craft a report for the Commission. The 
Cross-Case Analysis, Summary Findings, Discussion, Conclusion 
 
 136
Commission enlisted technical and facilitation experts to help the working group serve these 
collaborative functions. While the final product was not a consensus, the process itself fostered 
collective learning between DER and utility stakeholders. 
Settlement conferences served the collaborative function in the net metering case. These 
meetings create space for interest-based exchanges among the parties and allowed for creative 
brainstorming of policy solutions and joint problem solving. A key factor in the ability for 
settlement conferences to serve these functions was their confidential nature. The confidential 
nature of settlement freed stakeholders from the fear that their words would be used as a weapon 
against them in future hearings. During settlement, utility and DER stakeholders reached 
consensus on many issues, even if in the end they submitted dueling settlement agreements. 
The three key process stages that serve collaborative functions are educational technical 
sessions, confidential settlement conferences, and joint informal meetings between utilities and 
DER stakeholders. Each serves a related but distinct function. Technical sessions were used 
primarily for learning, dialogue, and incorporation of expert resources for the collective. 
Settlement conferences allowed parties to take the next step in crafting creative agreements and 
trading across issues. Informal negotiations provide for the more candid and free-flowing 
exchanges that are not always easily achieved in formal proceedings. Each stage represents an 




 PUC process alone, while necessary to achieving collaborative and innovative energy 
policy solutions, is insufficient to reaching consensus. In my research I identified other critical 
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variables, including stakeholder leadership and stakeholder commitment to guiding New 
Hampshire’s energy policy-making community towards mutually beneficial policy solutions. 
 The EERS and net metering cases illustrate two starkly different drivers of collaboration. 
In the former case, OEP Director Meredith Hatfield and other leaders took charge of shaping the 
process, both formal and informal, towards collaboration. In the latter case, the coercive threat of 
a chaotic and risky multiparty litigation brought stakeholders to the negotiation table during 
settlement. Both factors, leadership and the risky BATNA of an uncertain courtroom showdown, 
helped motivate the parties and instill in them a commitment to collaboration. 
The grid modernization case embodied neither the positive motivator of strong leadership 
nor the negative motivator of a weak BATNA. This case, while professedly collaborative, was 
less successful than EERS and net metering in reaching consensus, highlighting the importance 
of stakes, leadership, or some other motivating force to foster collaborative problem-solving 
between utilities and DER affiliates. 
Finally, the cases make clear that the Commission is no longer merely an institution 
necessary for “controlling the evils that result from monopoly [utility] corporations” (Meunier, 
1932). The disruption caused by DER proliferation has thrust a new responsibility upon the 
Commission, the responsibility of guiding the evolution of our energy system towards 
competition, decentralization, and sustainability. But this responsibility also falls to the energy 
policy-making community as a whole. Leaders representing the state, solar and other DER 
businesses, environmental advocates, utilities, and other interest groups must share the weight of 
this responsibility, not only in redesigning our energy policies, but also in redesigning the 
Commission itself as it evolves to take on a new role for a new century. 
 




The following is a list of recommendations for the Commission and for stakeholders from 
New Hampshire’s energy policy-making community who engage in Commission proceedings 
and wish to continue to cultivate a more collaborative approach to 21st century electricity market 
design. 
 
Recommendations for the Commission 
• The Commission should structure future proceedings addressing 21st century energy 
challenges to incorporate collaborative functions early on and throughout dockets. 
• The Commission should make hosting educational and deliberative technical sessions the 
norm, prior to proposal filings. 
• The Commission should consider hosting confidential settlement conferences earlier in 
the process. 
• The Commission should enlist expert resources such as RAP regularly to assist in 
educating stakeholders and facilitating processes. 
• The Commission should strengthen the capacity for facilitation of dockets, for example 
through facilitation and mediation training for Staff and/or regularly employing a 
facilitator. 
• The Commission should conduct investigative dockets addressing 21st century energy 
policy challenges using working groups, educational modules, or other formats that bring 
utility and DER stakeholders together for the purpose of collective learning. 
• The Commission should reassess the roles and mandates of both the Sustainable Energy 
Division and the Electric Division in light of the new challenges presented by 21st century 
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energy sector disruption and consider avenues to further integrate and expand the 
functions of these two divisions. 
 
Recommendations for New Hampshire’s Energy Policy-making Community 
• Stakeholders should approach the prehearing conference strategically and in concert with 
one another and use it to make process recommendations to suit the needs of each 
docket’s unique circumstances. 
• Stakeholders convening extracurricular meetings should include both DER and utility 
representatives. 
 
The outcomes of EERS and of Net Metering set in motion further collaborative 
opportunities and forums dedicated to the task of DER integration. The EERS decision directed 
the EESE Board to take on a new role as a stakeholder advisory board to the energy efficiency 
implementation plan. During the post-docket implementation planning phase, utility 
stakeholders, efficiency professionals, OCA, DES, and other stakeholders continued to work 
together in preparation for the policy rollout in 2018. In the Net Metering decision, the 
Commission ordered their staff to convene multiple working groups comprised of utility and 
DER stakeholders: one to assist in the development of the Value of DER Study through data 
collection efforts, and others to design pilot DER projects. These forums are critical 
opportunities for the state, the utility industry, and the DER coalition to build upon the progress 
that has been made over the past two years. And it is as we look forward to these new 
opportunities that I provide my concluding recommendations. 
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These recommendations are not directed at the Commission, for there is only so much we 
can collectively ask of them as we design the distributed grid of the 21st century. These 
recommendations are directed at New Hampshire’s community of energy professionals, the 
utilities and DER affiliates alike who have only just begun the hard work of decentralizing the 
power system. Dr. Raab (1994) writes of integrative negotiation that, “This somewhat radical 
concept is based on the assumption that we can better satisfy our own interests only through 
seeking to better satisfy the interests of our opponents.” I challenge the DER interest groups 
engaging in these new forums to learn as much as they can from their utility counterparts and 
then to use that knowledge to find solutions that satisfy the interests of the utility as well as their 
own. I challenge the utility managers to strive to make New Hampshire a national leader in 
dynamic and competitive DER markets in such a way that will simultaneously earn the utilities 
preeminence in their industry. 
I see in New Hampshire a state that has often led the nation in power sector innovation. 
Its cities were some of the first on Earth to be lit with electric light. New Hampshire played 
essential roles in the introduction of competition to the national energy sector, both in bulk 
power generation as made possible by PURPA, and in competitive retail electricity supply. Now, 
New Hampshire has an opportunity to again lead the nation by bringing innovation to markets 
for retail electricity services through competitive DER integration. The Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standard, Grid Modernization, and Net Metering dockets, while foundational in 
bringing the new structure and function of the Commission to the fore, are only the beginning. 
The hardest work is yet to come. It is up to this community to determine whether to proceed 
through an adversarial power struggle, or through a collaborative commitment to realize a 
collective benefit for us all.  
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APPENDIX C – SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
1. What is your current position? How long have you held this position and can you tell me 
how you became involved in this work? Could you talk briefly about your professional 
background and your current role with (insert organization here)? 
2. Could you describe your role/(insert organization here) role in New Hampshire’s energy 
policy-making process? 
3. How and when does (insert organization here) interact with other stakeholder groups 
throughout the process? 
a. During the various policy design processes you have participated in, do you 
engage with/collaborate with other stakeholders outside of formal meetings and 
procedural steps? Explain. 
4. Are there examples of times where you and other stakeholders in the process have been 
able to “think outside the box”, i.e. develop/brainstorm new policy options that surprised 
you (even if ideas did not end up being adopted)? 
5. In what ways, if any, does the process foster collaboration? 
6. In what ways, if any, does the process make it hard to collaborate with other 
stakeholders? 
7. What do you see as the benefits/limitations of adjudication? Of collaboration? 
a. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of discovery? 
b. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of technical sessions? 
c. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of settlement conferences? 
d. Can you talk about the benefits and limitations of litigated hearings? 
8. During the process do stakeholders tend to share or conceal information/interests? 
Explain. 
9. To what degree to you think different stakeholders in the process understand each other’s 
interests and positions? Can you provide examples? 
10. What about the process do you feel is successful? Could you provide examples? 
11. Can you describe frustrations or challenges you have experienced with the process? 
Could you provide examples? 
12. What kind of changes do you think would do most to improve the process? 
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APPENDIX D – OBSERVATIONS FROM GERMANY 
During the summer 2016 I visited Berlin as a guest research at the Freie Universität 
Berlin. During my visit I conducted eight interviews with experts and professionals involved in 
both Berlin’s and Germany’s energy transitions, or Energiewende. Interviewees included 
consultants involved in designing the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Germany’s legislative 
policy mechanism guiding national deployment of renewable energy technologies), experts from 
prominent German energy think tanks, and professionals employed by Berlin’s DER and utility 
sectors. Below is a summary of some observations from Germany that helped to broaden my 
perspective of the energy policy challenges the world is currently facing. 
Germany, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest economy in the world, is 
widely considered a leader in the sustainable energy transition (Baake, 2013; Jacobsson, 2004). 
Through its pioneering adoption of stable, long-term public policy support for clean energy 
under the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) (EEG), Germany has become a 
global center for research and investment in renewable energy technologies and a testing ground 
for technologies, policies, and regulatory models. (Wüstenhagen, 2004; Laes, et al., 2014). 
Berlin, the largest urban center in Germany and one of the 16 German länder (internal federal 
states of Germany), plays an important role in this leading nation’s overall energy transition.  
Germany is facing many of the same policy challenges as New Hampshire and the rest of 
the United States. The country is grappling with a surge of new technologies, and the associated 
challenges of redesigning its utility sector and energy marketplace to accommodate these new 




How to Compensate 21st Century Utilities for their Services? 
The high levels of DERs in Germany that have resulted from the EEG feed-in tariff 
highlight the conflict between deployment of these new energy technologies and the 
conventional electric utility business model. Since 2008, European electric utilities have faced 
extreme financial losses equal to more than half of their one trillion euro company value (Helms, 
2016). As a result, German utilities are scrambling to remake their business models to be more 
innovative, customer centric, and service oriented (e.g., distributed generation, micro-grid 
services, energy performance contracting, energy efficiency, demand response, and smart 
communication technologies) (Helms, 2016). The financial losses of German utilities highlight 
the risk posed to American utilities if they fail to address 21st century energy policy challenges 
and emphasize the need for utilities to remake their business models and discover new revenue 
streams. 
 
How to Compensate DERs for their Services? 
 One 21st century energy policy challenge relates to determining appropriate methods to 
compensate DERs including distributed generation (DG) such as solar. In contrast to net 
metering policies in the US, which in general terms compensate DG at retail electricity prices, 
similar systems in Germany receive compensation via a feed-in tariff established by the EEG. 
The feed-in tariff is a policy that sets prices per kWh for renewable energy technologies. Early 
feed-in tariff prices paid to renewables were as high as 40-50 cents per kWh, or 250% as much 
as retail electricity rates (Germany Interview 7, 2016). By comparison, distributed solar in the 
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continental U.S. is compensated at retail prices of no more than 18 cents per kWh, and 
oftentimes closer to 10 cents per kWh. 
In the US, policy makers are considering more sophisticated DER compensation 
approaches such as time-variant rates. Alternatively, Germany has shifted its approach from the 
feed-in tariff to a reverse auction for renewable energy projects.  
 
How to Design Adaptive Policies? 
Rapidly advancing technologies and markets pose another challenge to 21st century 
energy policy makers. In order to keep up with the pace of technology, Germany’s EEG is 
constantly being amended and revised as technologies improve and markets evolve. One German 
energy expert commented, “the EEG has been changed sometimes twice in one parliamentary 
period” (German Interview 6, 2016). The German model raises interesting questions about how 
to address the need for policy revisions in a rapidly changing environment.  
   
How to Manage Dispute Resolution Between New Market Actors and Utilities? 
Policy disputes between German utilities and DER affiliates are addressed by the 
Clearingstelle EEG, an institutional alternative dispute resolution mechanism that helps to avoid 
regular legal contests between the two sectors (German Interview 6, 2016). 
 
How to Address Issues of Data Access? 
Unlike their American counterparts, German energy market operators are not neutral and 
independent of the companies owning and operating power plants, transmission systems, and 
distribution systems within their territories (Germany Interview 3, 2016). The absence of an 
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independent and neutral market operator in German markets likely contributes to the relative 
lack of transparency found in those markets. 
To quote from the Agora Energiewende report Transparenzdefizite der Netzregulierung 
(Transparency Deficits of Network Regulation), 
The level of transparency in [German electricity markets] is highly insufficient. While countries 
such as Norway, UK and the Netherlands publish detailed data on the regulatory process and its 
results, German regulatory authorities have published no information on the results of their 
activities, not even aggregate data on distribution network costs. This broad lack of transparency 
and the resulting lack of data is problematic in several respects: Firstly, it hinders political 
decision making by effectively withholding data needed to evaluate economic effects of 
necessary decisions in light of the “Energiewende” (energy transition). Secondly, it considerably 
limits participation by consumers and thus precludes meaningful evaluation of the success (or 
failure) of electricity network regulation while raising the risk of regulatory capture. Thirdly, 
without sufficient transparency of the regulatory process and its results, new and innovative 
market players will hesitate to enter the market. Yet the observed lack of transparency doesn’t 
primarily result from inadequate or absent legal provisions. Rather… relevant provisions are 
either not effectively enforced or not adhered to (Agora Energiewende, 2008). 
 
As is the case in New Hampshire, transparency and access to data regarding the electricity 
system are of central importance to German energy policy challenges. Transparency deficiencies 
in German regulatory proceedings exacerbate this challenge. 
 
What is the Role of Public Participation in Energy Policy Making? 
The major policy addressing 21st century energy challenges in Berlin is the 2016 Energy 
Transition Act (EEC), which stipulates that by 2050 Berlin should reduce overall CO2 emissions 
by 85% relative to a 1990 baseline. The Berlin Energy and Climate Program 2030 (BEK) is the 
action plan that accompanies the legal framework of the EEC. The BEK is a result of a year of 
participatory processes (e.g., city forums, public comment sessions, public workshops) including 
hundreds of stakeholders from different areas of expertise. Three German energy professionals, 
two DER affiliates and one utility manager, said they expected little to come of the participatory 
processes that resulted in the BEK, and dismissed it as a toothless report (Germany Interviews 1, 
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2, 8, 2016). Other major efforts to address 21st century energy policy challenges in Berlin include 
initiatives to obtain cooperative ownership of Berlin’s power grid. The organizations leading 
these efforts, Bürger Energie Berlin and Berliner Energietisch, are backed by significant public, 
financial, and political support. Comparable cooperative utility models in the US include the 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District and Colorado’s city of Boulder utility municipalization 
efforts. These examples raise questions about the how to account for and accommodate public 
participation and engagement in 21st century energy policy decision making.
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APPENDIX E – GRID MODERNIZATION ROOM CONFIGURATION DIAGRAM
 
 During the grid modernization investigation, facilitators reconfigure the meeting room 
space to create a more conducive atmosphere for dialogue, learning, and free-flowing exchanges 
among the stakeholders. 
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